Sponsored Nuclear Proliferation: Why States Share Nuclear Weapons Technology
Abstract: Why do states share nuclear weapons technology—the most powerful military technology ever invented—with other states? The anarchic nature of international relations and the destructive power of nuclear weapons suggest that this type of cooperation should be very rare. And yet states have engaged in state-sponsored nuclear proliferation, defined as a government's intentional assistance to another state's nuclear weapon program, including the transfer of weapons-grade fissile material, the technology to produce fissile material, or warhead design information, since the dawn of the atomic age. The first such instance was Great Britain's sharing of the MAUD Report, the first government-sponsored study to conclude that nuclear weapons were feasible, with the United States in 1941. The most recent example was North Korea's assistance to Syria's nuclear reactor project, which was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in 2007. In all, since the discovery of fission in 1939 there have been nine cases of states sharing nuclear weapons technology with another state.
Four motivations have been identified as driving state-sponsored nuclear proliferation: national security, domestic politics, mercantilism, and mercenary. In short, states have sought to securitize, monetize, and politicize their nuclear weapon capabilities by sharing these capabilities with other states. Crafting an effective nonproliferation strategy to address the threat of state-sponsored nuclear proliferation requires a solid understanding of the determinants of nuclear weapon cooperation and the conditions which enable this behavior. In order to devise effective nonproliferation strategies, policy-makers need to understand what factors motivate states to share nuclear weapon technology and under what conditions such cooperation is more or less likely to take place.
Bio: Gregory D. Koblentz is an Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government. The Biodefense Graduate Program is a multidisciplinary research and education program designed to prepare students to work on issues at the nexus of health, science, and security and bridge the gap between science and policy. Prior to arriving at George Mason, Dr. Koblentz was a visiting assistant professor in the School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University. He has also worked for the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research and teaching focus on understanding the causes and consequences of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to state and non-state actors, global biorisk management, and the impact of emerging technologies on international security. He received a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School.
