Lecture Series

Abstract: The existential risks posed to the world by nuclear weapons are growing. Efforts to halt nuclear proliferation, manage crises, promote arms control, and build alliances are all considered fundamental to reducing the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe. Yet, no tool is guaranteed to succeed and some may even have unanticipated, counterproductive consequences for international security. In a field fixated on finding solutions, Atomic Backfires, edited by Stephen Herzog, Giles David Arceneaux, and Ariel F. W. Petrovics, provocatively takes the opposite tack. An impressive group of

Abstract: Polarization is a defining feature of politics in the United States and many other democracies. Yet although there is much research focusing on the effects of polarization on domestic politics, little is known about how polarization influences international cooperation and conflict. Democracies are thought to have advantages over nondemocratic nations in international relations, including the ability to keep foreign policy stable across time, credibly signal information to adversaries, and maintain commitments to allies. Does domestic polarization affect these “democratic advantages”

Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that innovation consistently improves military power by dramatically improving the effectiveness of a state's armed forces. Militaries that oppose innovation invite defeat, but those that innovate secure victory. This narrative is alluring and intuitive, but it is also wrong. Based on an in-progress book manuscript, Kendrick Kuo offers a conceptual approach that expands how we think about innovation's relationship to military effectiveness. He will also propose a framework for assessing risk profiles in military innovation based on the degree of creative

Abstract: The war in Ukraine, the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, and military competitions in Northeast Asia have raised the alarm about ‘nuclear threats.’ But how should decisionmakers and citizens distinguish serious nuclear threats that demand countervailing action, from nuclear threats that are mere noise aiming to manipulate nuclear anxiety without a serious threat? The less precise our nuclear discourse, the more fear nuclear manipulators can elicit. The challenge, or imperative, is to judge correctly in real time whether and when a decisionmaker is really on the verge of ordering

Abstract: Europe must urgently confront a new nuclear reality. In recent years, Russia’s nuclear-backed revisionism has reintroduced nuclear coercion and the threat of nuclear escalation to the continent, underscoring the importance of credible nuclear deterrence. At the same time, Europe’s traditional reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence appears politically more fragile than at any point since the Cold War. Together, these developments require Europeans to think about their nuclear options. Based on the report of the European Nuclear Study Group, presented at the Munich Security

Abstract: Former Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, known for his awkward speaking style, once said: “we wanted to make it better, but it turned out as always.” Russia’s war with Ukraine is a perfect match for Chernomyrdin’s most famous quote. Having launched the war falsely claiming that Ukraine posed an intolerable threat to its security, Russia will emerge from it less secure, more resentful, and more threatening to Europe than before the war. Its threat perceptions, shaped by geography, new weapons technologies, and an upheaval in transatlantic relations, will cast a long shadow

Abstract: The Russia-Ukraine war is the first since the fall of the Soviet Union in which two major nuclear powers have found themselves on opposing sides of a high-intensity war, even if only indirectly. At the strategic level, the war offers four key lessons for the United States. First, the risk of an adversary using nuclear weapons is real and cannot be dismissed. Second, even under the nuclear shadow, protracted and highly destructive conventional war remains possible. Third, escalation thresholds are not fixed in advance; they emerge through ongoing contestation and tacit bargaining

Abstract: Why do adversaries sometimes cooperate to restrain their military competition? Why do they design arms control agreements with intrusive verification in some cases but rely on minimal transparency in others? Amidst ongoing international competition, arms control remains rare despite potential mutual benefits, and agreements vary dramatically in their approaches to monitoring. This book reveals how uncertainty from domestic political changes - such as leadership transitions or social unrest - can enable arms control. It identifies two paths to agreement: during periods of uncertainty

Abstract: Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Bureaucracies at Warexamines how national security institutions shaped the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders based their choices for conflict — which institutional designs provided the best counsel, why those institutions performed better, and why many leaders failed to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provided the best information also empowered the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the

Abstract: This talk focuses on security cooperation in the form of wartime access—decisions by states to let other states fight wars from inside their borders. It will discuss how wartime access helps the United States to mitigate the tyranny of distance and project power around the world, and will demonstrate the centrality of wartime access to the wars the United States' has waged since WWII, as well as to the war the United States military prepares to fight in a hypothetical Taiwan invasion scenario. Although permissive wartime access has been a defining feature of the post-1945 world

Abstract: For years, the United States has tried to put China front and center, from the rebalance to more recent calls for prioritization. Yet it has never truly reconciled the limits of a one-major-war force with the reality of a multi-theater, multi-rival world—let alone a world in which U.S. rivals across different regions have growing incentives to support one another. In Breaking the Double Bind: U.S. Defense Strategy and Multi-Theater Deterrence, CSBA’s Vice President for Research and Studies, Evan Montgomery, argues that the Pentagon should downgrade its emphasis on denial of a Taiwan

Abstract: In an era of seemingly ever-increasing global tensions, technology competition is often mentioned as a pathway for U.S. and allied success. And yet, beyond doing more across the board regarding technology competition is not at all simple. First, it is a concept increasingly muddled together with other big issues such as innovation policy, national defense strategy, great power competition, allied cooperation, public-private partnerships, and a host of other issues. Second, it is inherently dynamic, an action-reaction cycle between multiple players. Third, there are limits to what you

Abstract: Economics has been weaponized on a global scale, driving it to be an active domain of statecraft with strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. Throughout US history, American policymakers have acknowledged that economic security is national security and today the two are enmeshed more than ever. Critically interdependent global markets, supply chains, and information flows are wound tightly by technology-enabled networks at a scale never experienced across human history. This brings new risks and vulnerabilities. Economics is therefore no longer solely a lever of national

Abstract: China is rapidly improving its military capabilities, transforming the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into an increasingly sophisticated and capable force. How China continues to develop its military power, how it thinks about the use of force, and how it seeks to employ military means to achieve broader political and strategic objectives will significantly shape global security and international politics in the decades to come. This presentation, based on a report by the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), will discuss how military power can be studied in general and with a

Abstract: Since the mid-2010s, the collapse of key arms control treaties between great powers has unraveled the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, heightening nuclear risks to Europe. At the same time, a fresh movement emerged, calling for the total abolition of nuclear weapons, due to their catastrophic humanitarian consequences. European policy-makers found themselves between a rock and a hard place – between the global strategic conundrum calling for growing attention to nuclear deterrence, and domestic audiences demanding just the opposite. Europe's Nuclear Umbrella is about

Abstract: Rapidly evolving drone technology is being used worldwide, from aerial photography to package delivery services, in agricultural uses and in aiding search and rescue missions after a natural disaster. Drones have also become a key tool in modern warfare and in the work of first responders. They are being acquired and used by criminals and other malicious actors which poses enhanced security threats. As drones are increasingly weaponised and incorporate enhanced AI features, public concerns about drones and calls for legal frameworks and regulations of drones are increasing. This

Abstract: At present, the speed of AI advancement outstrips current governance mechanisms. Advancing common understanding among all AI stakeholders – from governments to commercial developers to independent researchers – is imperative to the successful integration of assessment and verification measures. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides a mature, technical precedent for nuclear-focused, multilateral verification. This research does not argue for or against an “IAEA for AI” – a topic widely covered in existing literature – but assesses specific verification tools and

Abstract: This lecture describes how President Barack Obama and his administration used the negotiation and ratification of an arms control treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), as a vehicle for advancing one of the president’s primary foreign policy objectives, a reset of U.S. relations with Russia. Specifically, it examines the administration’s efforts to move from the president’s strategic vision for arms control to defining that vision as a policy priority and ultimately, successfully negotiating what the president deemed the first and most important element of the

Abstract: Mallory Stewart will discuss the Administration’s decision not to engage with Russia’s proposal for a one-year extension of the political caps. This will include the stated reasons, Russian and Chinese responses, and the challenges and potential opportunities that lie ahead. Mallory Stewart is the Chief Executive Officer of The Council on Strategic Risks. Her areas of expertise include weapons of mass destruction law and policy, missile defense, outer space security policy, and risk management regarding emerging and disruptive technologies. From 2022 to 2025, she served as the

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has provided technical input to the long process that led to the negotiation and signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This talk will provide an overview of that history as well as insight based on personal engagement into some of the significant events. Discussion will include the Congressionally mandated moratorium on nuclear testing (the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchel amendment to the 1993 Energy and Water Appropriation), the formation of the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SBSS), the “Confidence Conference” held in June 1995

Abstract: Over the past 75 years, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has been central to alliance security in Europe and Asia. That system now faces mounting strain as multiple adversaries expand and modernize their nuclear forces and as U.S. strategic priorities shift, raising serious questions about the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. guarantees. This lecture will trace the evolution of U.S. strategic thought on extended deterrence and assesses four broad options for the future: reducing commitments, expanding guarantees, maintaining the status quo, or sharing deterrence responsibilities

Abstract: Changes in adversary nuclear forces have always been a key driver of U.S. force structure decisions. Thus, it is no surprise that in response to China’s nuclear expansion, questions about nuclear sufficiency are back at the forefront of the debate. While there is growing consensus in the strategic community that the current modernization program is insufficient, there is no agreement on the necessary size and composition of U.S. nuclear forces for adversarial multipolarity. But before we engage in these “numbers discussions,” we must first revisit the force sizing metrics that have

Abstract: We are entering a new age. That new age is dominated by two major powers – the United States and China – and a rising number of countries able to protect and assert themselves as well as influence, even shape the course of international events. That new age is thus increasingly multipolar and different from the bipolar age of the Cold War, which was ruled by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the unipolar age of the post-Cold War, which had Washington at the helm. Its key feature is strategic autonomy. That new age has far-reaching implications for the United States, and

Abstract: In an era of great power competition and a worsening security environment, the nuclear ban treaty might appear to be at risk of irrelevance. Yet ignoring the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) would come with risks to extended nuclear deterrence and the nuclear order for the United States and its allies and partners. This volume offers an original and in-depth examination of the theories, politics, and debates involved in the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons conferences and negotiation of the TPNW. There are numerous histories of the TPNW, however they have

Abstract: Western Russia experts are too often tempted to engage in mind‑reading, prophecies, and “essentialist” claims about Russians, but this obscures more than it explains. A sober baseline starts with facts: Russia’s nuclear arsenal and continental scale mean it cannot simply be wished away or fully isolated while Vladimir Putin retains coercive tools. This talk will touch on Putin’s evolution from early‑2000s legalist pragmatist to geopolitical revisionist and ideological authoritarian, shaped by fears of “color revolutions” and pandemic isolation. On Ukraine, it will posit that the

Abstract: Mr. Goodrich will discuss China’s frontier science and technology efforts, including AI, fusion energy, semiconductors, supercomputing, and approaches to open-source research methodology. Jimmy Goodrich is a leading expert on technology, geopolitics, and national security with a focus on China and East Asia. He is a Senior Advisor for Technology Analysis at the RAND Corporation and a nonresident fellow at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation where he works on research regarding China, technology and national competitiveness. Technical Contact

Abstract: Reid Pauly will discuss his new book, The Art of Coercion (Cornell University Press, 2025), which presents a fresh explanation for the success—and failure—of coercive demands in international politics. Strong states are surprisingly bad at coercion. History shows they prevail only a third of the time. Pauly argues that coercion often fails because targets fear punishment even if they comply. In this “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario, targets have little reason to obey. Pauly illustrates this logic in nuclear counterproliferation efforts with South Africa, Iraq, Libya

Abstract: The Trump Administration is moving quickly to deploy strategic defenses against nuclear threats to the United States. This is as much an evolutionary step as a radical change; nonetheless there are many uncertainties in this effort that should be fully considered as the Golden Dome effort moves forward. Mr. Mallin will bring an historical as well as a forward-leaning perspective, discuss some of the deterrence implications and other challenges inherent in this effort, and offer a path forward that may help to mitigate inherent uncertainties associated with this initiative. Mr. Monte

Abstract: Many scholars assume that classical arms control theory, derived from U.S.-Soviet experiences, is universal. But China—being the weaker party in an asymmetric nuclear relationship—has developed its own distinct tradition. China's arms control tradition seeks to safeguard national defense modernization, prioritize developing military capabilities over reassurance and risk reduction, and maintain a high level of secrecy. This approach faces new challenges as China's nuclear capabilities increase. Through nuclear learning, China needs to update its core beliefs regarding arms control

Abstract: Following decades of mostly successful efforts to combat the spread of nuclear weapons, multiple global trends are reviving the possibility of a world with more nuclear-armed states. These developments raise fundamental questions about whether the United States can and should prioritize efforts to stymie further acquisition of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. The presentation will cover analysis, findings, and recommendations from a bipartisan task force of former national security professionals and experts convened by Harvard’s Belfer Center, the Carnegie Endowment for

Abstract: How will artificial intelligence affect strategic stability—whether states go to war and whether those wars go nuclear? Pundits and practitioners proclaim the revolutionary impact of artificial intelligence for intelligence, targeting, allocation of weapons, and even lethality. However, as AI changes military power, it also has implications for strategic stability. Early warning, nuclear stability, and incentives for first strike are all impacted by how AI is developed, tested, integrated, and applied to military power. What efforts are already being taken by the US military and what

Abstract: China has a sophisticated and well-resourced cyber warfare program and has compromised critical infrastructure in the U.S. and around the world. U.S. law and policy have historically constrained U.S. government directly defending critical power, water and pipeline networks which are almost entirely owned and operated by the private sector. Yet Americans expect their water to be clean, their lights to be on and their trains to run. Could AI generated digital twins of critical infrastructure be a way to bridge public and private efforts to find and fix vulnerabilities in the nation’s

Abstract: The dramatic worsening of the international security environment following Russia’s two invasions of Ukraine, and China’s decision to dramatically grow their nuclear forces poses a serious challenge to U.S. national security strategy writ large, and to U.S. nuclear strategy in particular. Formulating a U.S. strategy to address the impending two peer threat environment is necessary if the nation is to ensure that it has the nuclear forces necessary to enable our strategy in the mid 2030s. The most urgent imperative is to augment U.S. theater nuclear forces. Our current and planned

Abstract: The lecture focuses on how Russian military thinkers interpret and operationalize the threat perceptions defined by the country’s political leadership. This presentation argues that although Russian operations in Ukraine reveal a degree of adaptability, the war has not reshaped Russia’s broader framework of threat perceptions. Rather than introducing fundamentally new assessments, current military discourse tends to reinterpret established concerns through the lens of ongoing conflict. In effect, Russia’s experience in Ukraine has not altered Russia’s security anxieties but has

Abstract: Most observers depict innovation in the Russia-Ukraine War as extraordinarily dynamic, rapid, and ever-present. While this may be true at the tactical level of war, is it true of Russian military strategic and operational thinking? Is operational thought experiencing the same rapid evolution as tactical thought? How the Russia-Ukraine War changing how military elites in Russia approach the problem of fighting a regional or even global conflict against NATO? Mike Petersen will discuss the state of Russian military operational art among Russian military elites, and how those elites

This presentation, based on a recently published RAND report, will analyze how Russian strategic culture shapes the country’s nuclear posture, with a particular focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs).

With China as the pacing challenge and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as the pacing scenario, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management as it considers its approach to prosecuting a hypothetical future conflict with China.

China views tensions and competition with the West, especially the United States, as inevitable due to its rising economic and political power and conflicting strategic objectives, prompting the development of a deterrence strategy called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) to guide political and military decisions during crises.

If China decides to attempt to forcibly annex Taiwan and the United States elects to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, two of the world’s largest nuclear powers may become engaged in armed conflict in the western Pacific.

The potential emergence of artificial general intelligence (AGI) is plausible and should be taken seriously by the U.S. national security community. Yet the pace and potential progress of AGI's emergence.

The time has come for the United States to build a collective defense pact in Asia. For decades, such a pact was neither possible nor necessary. Today, in the face of a growing threat from China, it is both viable and essential.

An old debate has been given new life by the changing security environment. This is the debate about whether US nuclear deterrence strategy should continue to have a significant counterforce component.

China's grand strategy under Xi offers great resemblance to the traditional international relations structure and system of the Middle Kingdom historically.

While South Korea remains a non-nuclear U.S. ally under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, domestic support for developing its own independent nuclear weapons is high and growing.

Mr. Inglis will describe the current state of digital infrastructure in a world increasingly dependent on it.

Adversary cooperation and opportunism is growing to such an extent between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran that it is no longer sufficient label China “the pacing threat.”

Markus Garlauskas will discuss the GUARDIAN TIGER effort on deterring, preparing for and countering limited nuclear attacks in East Asia, with allies and partners.

Divergent assessments about the nature of China’s strategic relationships and how much military and security cooperation a given relationship will support are largely due to conceptual confusion about how to think about alliances and strategic alignment.

The United States and its partners face an authoritarian axis that spans the Eurasian landmass.

Ankit Panda joins CGSR to discuss his new book, ‘The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon’, and the changing landscape of nuclear security and strategy.