Lecture Series

Abstract: Changes in adversary nuclear forces have always been a key driver of U.S. force structure decisions. Thus, it is no surprise that in response to China’s nuclear expansion, questions about nuclear sufficiency are back at the forefront of the debate. While there is growing consensus in the strategic community that the current modernization program is insufficient, there is no agreement on the necessary size and composition of U.S. nuclear forces for adversarial multipolarity. But before we engage in these “numbers discussions,” we must first revisit the force sizing metrics that have

Abstract: We are entering a new age. That new age is dominated by two major powers – the United States and China – and a rising number of countries able to protect and assert themselves as well as influence, even shape the course of international events. That new age is thus increasingly multipolar and different from the bipolar age of the Cold War, which was ruled by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the unipolar age of the post-Cold War, which had Washington at the helm. Its key feature is strategic autonomy. That new age has far-reaching implications for the United States, and

Abstract: In an era of great power competition and a worsening security environment, the nuclear ban treaty might appear to be at risk of irrelevance. Yet ignoring the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) would come with risks to extended nuclear deterrence and the nuclear order for the United States and its allies and partners. This volume offers an original and in-depth examination of the theories, politics, and debates involved in the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons conferences and negotiation of the TPNW. There are numerous histories of the TPNW, however they have

Abstract: Western Russia experts are too often tempted to engage in mind‑reading, prophecies, and “essentialist” claims about Russians, but this obscures more than it explains. A sober baseline starts with facts: Russia’s nuclear arsenal and continental scale mean it cannot simply be wished away or fully isolated while Vladimir Putin retains coercive tools. This talk will touch on Putin’s evolution from early‑2000s legalist pragmatist to geopolitical revisionist and ideological authoritarian, shaped by fears of “color revolutions” and pandemic isolation. On Ukraine, it will posit that the

Abstract: Mr. Goodrich will discuss China’s frontier science and technology efforts, including AI, fusion energy, semiconductors, supercomputing, and approaches to open-source research methodology. Jimmy Goodrich is a leading expert on technology, geopolitics, and national security with a focus on China and East Asia. He is a Senior Advisor for Technology Analysis at the RAND Corporation and a nonresident fellow at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation where he works on research regarding China, technology and national competitiveness. Technical Contact

Abstract: Reid Pauly will discuss his new book, The Art of Coercion (Cornell University Press, 2025), which presents a fresh explanation for the success—and failure—of coercive demands in international politics. Strong states are surprisingly bad at coercion. History shows they prevail only a third of the time. Pauly argues that coercion often fails because targets fear punishment even if they comply. In this “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario, targets have little reason to obey. Pauly illustrates this logic in nuclear counterproliferation efforts with South Africa, Iraq, Libya

Abstract: The Trump Administration is moving quickly to deploy strategic defenses against nuclear threats to the United States. This is as much an evolutionary step as a radical change; nonetheless there are many uncertainties in this effort that should be fully considered as the Golden Dome effort moves forward. Mr. Mallin will bring an historical as well as a forward-leaning perspective, discuss some of the deterrence implications and other challenges inherent in this effort, and offer a path forward that may help to mitigate inherent uncertainties associated with this initiative. Mr. Monte

Abstract: Many scholars assume that classical arms control theory, derived from U.S.-Soviet experiences, is universal. But China—being the weaker party in an asymmetric nuclear relationship—has developed its own distinct tradition. China's arms control tradition seeks to safeguard national defense modernization, prioritize developing military capabilities over reassurance and risk reduction, and maintain a high level of secrecy. This approach faces new challenges as China's nuclear capabilities increase. Through nuclear learning, China needs to update its core beliefs regarding arms control

Abstract: How will artificial intelligence affect strategic stability—whether states go to war and whether those wars go nuclear? Pundits and practitioners proclaim the revolutionary impact of artificial intelligence for intelligence, targeting, allocation of weapons, and even lethality. However, as AI changes military power, it also has implications for strategic stability. Early warning, nuclear stability, and incentives for first strike are all impacted by how AI is developed, tested, integrated, and applied to military power. What efforts are already being taken by the US military and what

Abstract: China has a sophisticated and well-resourced cyber warfare program and has compromised critical infrastructure in the U.S. and around the world. U.S. law and policy have historically constrained U.S. government directly defending critical power, water and pipeline networks which are almost entirely owned and operated by the private sector. Yet Americans expect their water to be clean, their lights to be on and their trains to run. Could AI generated digital twins of critical infrastructure be a way to bridge public and private efforts to find and fix vulnerabilities in the nation’s

Abstract: The dramatic worsening of the international security environment following Russia’s two invasions of Ukraine, and China’s decision to dramatically grow their nuclear forces poses a serious challenge to U.S. national security strategy writ large, and to U.S. nuclear strategy in particular. Formulating a U.S. strategy to address the impending two peer threat environment is necessary if the nation is to ensure that it has the nuclear forces necessary to enable our strategy in the mid 2030s. The most urgent imperative is to augment U.S. theater nuclear forces. Our current and planned

Abstract: The lecture focuses on how Russian military thinkers interpret and operationalize the threat perceptions defined by the country’s political leadership. This presentation argues that although Russian operations in Ukraine reveal a degree of adaptability, the war has not reshaped Russia’s broader framework of threat perceptions. Rather than introducing fundamentally new assessments, current military discourse tends to reinterpret established concerns through the lens of ongoing conflict. In effect, Russia’s experience in Ukraine has not altered Russia’s security anxieties but has

Abstract: Most observers depict innovation in the Russia-Ukraine War as extraordinarily dynamic, rapid, and ever-present. While this may be true at the tactical level of war, is it true of Russian military strategic and operational thinking? Is operational thought experiencing the same rapid evolution as tactical thought? How the Russia-Ukraine War changing how military elites in Russia approach the problem of fighting a regional or even global conflict against NATO? Mike Petersen will discuss the state of Russian military operational art among Russian military elites, and how those elites

This presentation, based on a recently published RAND report, will analyze how Russian strategic culture shapes the country’s nuclear posture, with a particular focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs).

With China as the pacing challenge and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as the pacing scenario, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management as it considers its approach to prosecuting a hypothetical future conflict with China.

China views tensions and competition with the West, especially the United States, as inevitable due to its rising economic and political power and conflicting strategic objectives, prompting the development of a deterrence strategy called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) to guide political and military decisions during crises.

If China decides to attempt to forcibly annex Taiwan and the United States elects to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, two of the world’s largest nuclear powers may become engaged in armed conflict in the western Pacific.

The potential emergence of artificial general intelligence (AGI) is plausible and should be taken seriously by the U.S. national security community. Yet the pace and potential progress of AGI's emergence.

The time has come for the United States to build a collective defense pact in Asia. For decades, such a pact was neither possible nor necessary. Today, in the face of a growing threat from China, it is both viable and essential.

An old debate has been given new life by the changing security environment. This is the debate about whether US nuclear deterrence strategy should continue to have a significant counterforce component.

China's grand strategy under Xi offers great resemblance to the traditional international relations structure and system of the Middle Kingdom historically.

While South Korea remains a non-nuclear U.S. ally under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, domestic support for developing its own independent nuclear weapons is high and growing.

Mr. Inglis will describe the current state of digital infrastructure in a world increasingly dependent on it.

Adversary cooperation and opportunism is growing to such an extent between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran that it is no longer sufficient label China “the pacing threat.”

Markus Garlauskas will discuss the GUARDIAN TIGER effort on deterring, preparing for and countering limited nuclear attacks in East Asia, with allies and partners.

Divergent assessments about the nature of China’s strategic relationships and how much military and security cooperation a given relationship will support are largely due to conceptual confusion about how to think about alliances and strategic alignment.

The United States and its partners face an authoritarian axis that spans the Eurasian landmass.

Ankit Panda joins CGSR to discuss his new book, ‘The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon’, and the changing landscape of nuclear security and strategy.

Former NSC China Director Matt Turpin will discuss outlines of U.S. China policy as the rivalry between Beijing and Washington has taken center stage in U.S. policymaking over the past decade.

How can states use military force to achieve their political aims without triggering a catastrophic nuclear war? How has China coped with this dilemma?

Post-Cold War homeland missile defense strategy has focused on defending against ballistic missile threats from rogue states.

This article draws on the stability-instability paradox to compare the prospect for limited war between the United States and China to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry Cold War.

How does nuclear technology influence international relations? While many books focus on countries armed with nuclear weapons, this volume puts the spotlight on those that have the technology to build nuclear bombs but choose not to.

How will the war in Ukraine end? Where will U.S.-Russian relations go next? How should we think about Moscow’s role in the so-called “axis” with Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing? What comes next in Russia after President Putin leaves the scene? What is the true state of the Russian economy? Is there a hope for nuclear arms control with Moscow in this administration? Given all of the big questions out there at the moment, this is an opportune time to welcome in a renowned expert for an informal, off-the-record conversation on all things Russia. Mr. Matthew Rojansky, President and Chief Executive

The session will provide fresh insights into strategic competition and superpower dynamics by examining China's strategy, intentions, and decision-making calculus.

Although the Unites States and its allies may yet dissuade Iran from getting the bomb, policymakers need to consider the kind of force that it might build if it succeeds in crossing the nuclear threshold.

At the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi Jinping called on the People’s Liberation Army to build a “strong system of strategic deterrence.”

Whatever “nuclear order” existed through the 20th century has now come nearly undone.

Information Operations (IO) play a pivotal role in integrated deterrence strategies, serving as a critical enabler in the realm of nuclear deterrence.

In light of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine since 2022, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has degraded significantly, and escalation risks have increased.

In light of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine since 2022, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has degraded significantly, and escalation risks have increased.

The United States faces the unprecedented challenge of simultaneously navigating three escalating factors: a denser international economic landscape, a more fiercely disputed geostrategic environment, and increasing sustainability concerns.

China's nuclear buildup is not only a response to perceived changes in its external environment but also a result of significant shifts in its internal decision-making dynamics.

The rapid pace of novel technological change (referred to as ‘emerging technologies’) is challenging our ability to devise policy and governance apace.

This presentation draws on several years of research into Russian force structure and operational concept development to project where the Russian military may be headed over the next ten years.

Commercial smallsats are increasingly relevant to US national security.

Our nuclear world is as dangerous today as it has been for at least a generation.

The literature on deterrence and how it relates to the space domain has evolved significantly over the past 15 years or so.

Since the nineteenth century, wargaming has been a component of planning and training in military contexts – and its techniques and concepts have spread to many other arenas.

Ms. Stewart will share perspectives on the development of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) drone swarm and manned/unmanned teaming.