Germany's Nuclear Interests

Abstract: Putin's war in Ukraine did not only transform Europe's and particularly Germany's security policy – emblematically mirrored in the "Zeitenwende" – it also slowly led to an evolution in the nuclear realm. In June 2022, four months after Moscow's attack, a poll indicated that 52% percent of the Germans were in favour of US nuclear weapons on German soil. 65% of the supporters were voters of the Green Party. What happened in a country which is and will remain a non-nuclear state and which saw the sharpest anti-nuclear protests in the past? Apparently, the war in Ukraine, its geographical closeness, and the danger of nuclear escalation by Russia has caused (careful) changes in Germany's traditional anti-nuclear sentiments. Hence, it is worth to raise three questions: What has Russia's attack changed with respect to the role of nuclear weapons and the value of deterrence? What are Germany's future nuclear interests (which are arguably comparable to those of many other European countries)? What does Germany need to do to shape its nuclear future in NATO?

Bio: Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp has been an associate fellow in DGAP's Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia since October 2023. He holds a lectureship at the University Roma Tre in Rome and was the political director's representative at Germany's Federal Ministry of Defence until 2023. Prior to that, he was president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin. From 2007 to 2013, Dr. Kamp was director of research at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Previously, he held various positions at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bonn and Berlin as well as in the planning staff of Germany's Federal Foreign Office. Dr. Kamp is also the co-editor of the German strategic journal "Sirius" and he published more than 400 articles on security policy issues in books and journals.