Explaining Stability in Nuclear Thinking: Grand Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, and Policy Change

Abstract: Why do states rarely change how they think about the utility of their nuclear weapons? The stability of nuclear thinking that we observe in the historical record is puzzling because we do see variation between nuclear-armed states in how they conceive of the utility of nuclear weapons; states are not generally wholly resistant to evaluation and innovation with respect to other military technologies; and nuclear- armed states' security environments often change in fundamental ways. This paper makes several contributions in answering this question. First, I introduce the concept of "nuclear learning" and outline the different ways in which states can understand the utility of their nuclear weapons. Second, I offer a theoretical explanation for the stability of nuclear thinking, identifying a range of mechanisms that typically prevent states from shifting their nuclear thinking. Further, I argue that in periods of grand strategic change—when a state's entire political-military strategy is in flux—the powerful forces inhibiting shifts of nuclear thinking are more likely to be overcome. Grand strategic change, therefore, is a necessary condition for changes in nuclear thinking. Third, I examine a range of observable implications of the argument empirically using the history of U.S. nuclear thinking since 1945; the failed efforts to shift U.S. thinking in the Clinton administration; and the South African decision to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Finally, I draw conclusions for our understanding of the role that nuclear weapons play in international politics, the way in which "nuclear learning" occurs, and current policy debates.

Bio: Mark Bell is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. His research examines issues relating to nuclear weapons and proliferation, international relations theory, and US and British foreign policy. His first book, Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave, examines how states change their foreign policies when they acquire nuclear weapons, was published in 2021 by Cornell University Press as part of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs series. Other work has been published in journals including International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Strategic Studies, Texas National Security Review, and Defense Studies, and has been funded by organizations including the Stanton Foundation, the US Air Force Academy and Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Charles Koch Foundation, and the Tobin Project. He holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Masters in Public Policy from Harvard Kennedy School, where he was a Frank Knox Memorial Fellow, and a B.A. in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from St. Anne's College, Oxford University.