Merits of Uncertainty: The Evolution and Future of China’s Nuclear Retaliatory Capability WU Riqiang

February 28, 2019

A simplified nuclear exchange model has been developed to evaluate China’s past and current nuclear retaliatory capability against the Soviet Union and the United States. This modeling suggests that according to Western standards, China’s nuclear retaliation has been and remains far from “assured.” This result reflects China’s special nuclear philosophy, which emphasizes the role of nuclear taboo and prioritizes political control over survivability. The prospects of the offense-defense competition between Beijing and Washington is mixed. Given China’s economic and technical capacity, it is highly unlikely that the United States could reduce China’s nuclear deterrence to under 2010 levels.

Dr. WU Riqiang is a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School and an associate professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China. His work focuses on technical arms control issues including missile defense, nuclear strategy and China-U.S. strategic stability. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Tsinghua University, China, in 2012. Prior to that, he worked for six years at the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation as a missile engineer. He previously held visiting fellowships at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University and Dartmouth College. He received his M.Sc. and B.E. from Harbin Institute of Technology, China.