Defense Science Board Task Force Deterring, Preventing, and Responding to the Threat or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Chemical and Biological Threats
Dr. Miriam John

April 26, 2017

DoD’s Defense Science Board (DSB) recently completed a 3-part study addressing current and projected WMD threats. This talk will focus on that part of the effort which dealt with chemical and biological threats. The study began with a look at the security environment, concluding that defense planning has been focused for too long on a few dangerous but well understood threats. Too little attention has focused on improved chemical warfare (CW) agents with properties that make deployed protective measures ineffective, on commercial chemicals repurposed as weapons, and on violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the biological area, there are also troubling developments. With rapid advances in synthetic biology, there is growing potential for fundamentally new classes of biological warfare (BW) threats which are nearly impossible to predict. Although there has been no direct attack on US forces, civilians, or allies with advanced capabilities, a pattern has emerged of treaty violations and limited state and non-state use, as in Syria. The study then examined the DoD response. Noting an apparent lack of interest in the CBW threat for much of the last decade, the study applauds recent efforts to reexamine both the problem and the response. In formulating an effective DoD strategy, a critical question is how to go beyond simply adapting historical protection strategies with new technologies. The DSB task force attempted a “green field” approach to developing a more effective strategy and recommends something old that is new again – a defense-in-depth strategy that will require a more balanced and comprehensive acquisition and operational approach that stays the course (much like the nation has pursued for addressing nuclear threats, but with some important differences in emphasis).

Dr. Miriam E. John is serving in various consulting and board roles since her retirement as Vice President of Sandia’s California Laboratory in Livermore, California. During her Sandia career, she worked on a wide variety of programs, including nuclear weapons, chemical and biological defense, missile defense, solar energy, and provided leadership for a number of the laboratory’s energy, national security, and homeland security programs..

Deterring, Preventing, and Responding to the Threat or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

DoD’s Defense Science Board (DSB) recently completed a 3-part study addressing current and projected WMD threats. This talk will focus on that part of the effort which dealt with chemical and biological threats. The study began with a look at the security environment, concluding that defense planning has been focused for too long on a few dangerous but well understood threats. Too little attention has focused on improved chemical warfare (CW) agents with properties that make deployed protective measures ineffective, on commercial chemicals repurposed as weapons, and on violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the biological area, there are also troubling developments. With rapid advances in synthetic biology, there is growing potential for fundamentally new classes of biological warfare (BW) threats which are nearly impossible to predict. Although there has been no direct attack on US forces, civilians, or allies with advanced capabilities, a pattern has emerged of treaty violations and limited state and non-state use, as in Syria. The study then examined the DoD response. Noting an apparent lack of interest in the CBW threat for much of the last decade, the study applauds recent efforts to reexamine both the problem and the response. In formulating an effective DoD strategy, a critical question is how to go beyond simply adapting historical protection strategies with new technologies. The DSB task force attempted a “green field” approach to developing a more effective strategy and recommends something old that is new again – a defense-in-depth strategy that will require a more balanced and comprehensive acquisition and operational approach that stays the course (much like the nation has pursued for addressing nuclear threats, but with some important differences in emphasis).

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