Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: Is it as bad as it looks?
Dr. Ashley J. Tellis

January 11, 2017

In contrast to the rest of the world where nuclear weapons stockpiles have been gradually reducing, China, India, and Pakistan remain today the only countries whose nuclear weapons inventories are growing. This inventory growth in all three nations is matched by increases in technical sophistication, but what is perhaps most problematic is that China, India and Pakistan are trapped in interlocking disputes that promise to intensify in the years ahead. These rivalries, which involve struggles over territory, ideological and institutional antagonisms, and a quest for regional or extra-regional primacy, raise difficult questions about whether nuclear deterrence could ever be stable in tri-cornered circumstances defined by competitors of sharply different economic, military, technical and institutional strengths. How should stability be understood in such circumstances and can it ever obtain?

Dr. Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, will discuss these issues, arguing that—at least for the moment—deterrence instability in Southern Asia arises less from asymmetrical capabilities and more from provocative political behaviors.

Dr. Tellis specializes in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. While on assignment to the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the under secretary of state for political affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India. Previously, he was commissioned into the Foreign Service and served as senior adviser to the ambassador at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi. He also served on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning and Southwest Asia.