Recommended Reads

books

Issue 4 — 2025

What We’ve Been Reading (and Re-Reading) at CGSR Lately

Dive into the books/articles that have captured our attention recently. From thought-provoking reads to timeless favorites worth revisiting, here's a glimpse into what’s been on our "shelves" at CGSR.

Order of exculusion

Orders of Exclusion: Great Powers and the Strategic Sources of Foundational Rules in International Relations by Kyle Lascurettes (2025). The motivations behind why and when powerful countries seek to change the international order—the set of rules guiding global politics—are increasingly relevant in today’s shifting geopolitical landscape. Recent actions by the Trump administration, which showed disregard for the established liberal international order, and the growing influence of China, which may seek to reshape the order to its advantage, have intensified debates about the forces driving great powers to alter global rules. While previous research often emphasized consensus and inclusivity in the formation of international orders, Lascurettes presents a contrasting view. He argues that dominant powers are primarily motivated by exclusion when they seek to enact major changes. These powers act when they perceive significant new threats—whether from rival states or ideological movements—and aim to exclude these threats from gaining further influence. According to Lascurettes, the creation and rewriting of foundational international rules is less about cooperation and more about strategic efforts to contain or block perceived adversaries. This exclusionary approach, he asserts, has been a consistent feature of international order building for over three centuries, representing a continuation of traditional power politics through the crafting of global rules. (339 pages).

America's Great Power Opportunity

America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition by Ali Wyne (2025). The prevailing view in U.S. foreign policy circles is that America must adapt to a new era of “great-power competition,” particularly in response to rising challenges from China and Russia. After the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a period of dominance but became distracted by conflicts in the Middle East. Now, with its influence being tested by two authoritarian rivals, the question arises: how should the U.S. respond? In his analysis, Ali Wyne critically examines the concept of great-power competition as a guiding strategy for U.S. foreign policy. He cautions that framing policy in these terms could make the United States overly defensive and reactive, allowing rivals to dictate its actions. Wyne urges Washington to avoid extremes—neither complacency nor alarmism—and instead adopt a balanced approach that selectively contests Chinese and Russian moves without letting them set America’s agenda. By analyzing the dynamics of a rising China, a disruptive Russia, and the growing partnership between them, Wyne argues that the U.S. faces not just a challenge, but an opportunity. He advocates for a confident, proactive strategy that manages these global shifts while focusing on renewal both domestically and internationally. (224 pages).

The Art of Coercion

The Art of Coercion: Credible Threats and the Assurance Dilemma by Reid B.C. Pauly (2025). Pauly offers a new perspective on why coercive strategies in international politics often fail, even when employed by powerful states. Contrary to expectations, strong states succeed in coercion only about one-third of the time. Pauly argues that this is largely because targets of coercion fear they will be punished regardless of whether they comply with demands—a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation. This dynamic discourages compliance, as targets see little incentive to obey if punishment seems inevitable either way. Pauly explores this logic through case studies of nuclear counterproliferation efforts involving South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. He identifies an “assurance dilemma” for coercers: as threats become more credible, promises not to punish upon compliance become less believable. Without credible assurances, targets may resist, expecting negative consequences no matter their actions. For coercion to be effective, states must convince targets not only that noncompliance will bring punishment, but also that compliance will bring safety. Pauly’s analysis challenges the assumption that simply making tougher threats leads to success, offering valuable insights for policymakers using coercive strategies in foreign affairs. (252 pages).

 


Articles

 

Politically Unthinkable? The Missing Dimension Of Nuclear Use Scenarios by Jeffrey Michaels (2025). This article critically examines the foundations of nuclear deterrence strategies, which are based on hypothetical scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons. Despite the centrality of these scenarios, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since 1945. Michaels questions why nuclear use appears plausible in strategic scenarios but not in real-world practice. The article suggests that traditional scenarios often overlook the significant political challenges and decision-making barriers involved in actually crossing the nuclear threshold. By analyzing Cold War-era American debates about the possibility of a Soviet ‘first strike,’ the article highlights the limitations of focusing solely on technical aspects—such as weapon capabilities and delivery systems—when evaluating nuclear use scenarios. Instead, Michaels argues for a new approach to scenario design and critique, one that incorporates the political dynamics and constraints observed during actual crises and confrontations between nuclear states. Including these political factors would likely alter the perceived utility and credibility of deterrence strategies, making them more realistic and relevant. Ultimately, Michaels calls for a more nuanced understanding of nuclear deterrence, one that recognizes the complex interplay of technical and political considerations in shaping state behavior and strategic planning. (18 pages).

Allies as Armaments: Explaining the Specialization of State Military Capabilities by J. Andres Gannon (2025). This article explores why states often under-produce certain military capabilities while over-producing others, potentially leaving themselves exposed to risks. It argues that alliances play a key role in this dynamic by allowing states to safely specialize in specific military areas, knowing that their allies can compensate for any deficiencies. By analyzing detailed data on military capabilities, the study introduces a new way to measure military specialization and finds that states with strong alliance partners are more likely to focus their military resources rather than maintaining a broad, self-sufficient force. This challenges traditional views that see internal military buildup and reliance on allies as opposing strategies, showing instead that alliances can enable both specialization and diversification. The findings have significant implications for debates about how countries share defense responsibilities and point to new directions for research on military planning and alliance effects. (30 pages).

From Assurance to Resilience: Adapting NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy by Tomáš Nagy (March 2025) Nagy examines how NATO’s nuclear strategy must evolve in response to recent security challenges, especially those posed by Russia’s aggression and nuclear signaling. Nagy argues that the return of high-intensity conflict in Europe, coupled with doubts about the reliability of transatlantic commitments, has made NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture more important than ever. The paper emphasizes that NATO must move beyond simply assuring allies of its protection and instead build resilience into its nuclear deterrence policy. Nagy proposes that resilience should be developed across three key areas: capabilities, resolve, and communication. This means not only maintaining credible nuclear forces, but also strengthening the political will to use them if necessary, and improving how NATO communicates its deterrence intentions to both allies and adversaries. By focusing on resilience, NATO can adapt to a more unpredictable security environment, deter adversaries more effectively, and reinforce internal unity and public confidence within the Alliance. Ultimately, Nagy’s analysis underscores the need for a comprehensive and adaptive nuclear policy that addresses both external threats and internal cohesion, ensuring NATO’s continued credibility and effectiveness in the face of evolving nuclear risks. (24 pages).

How to Survive the New Nuclear Age by Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi (2025). Narang and Vaddi analyze the growing complexities and dangers of today’s nuclear landscape. They argue that the traditional nuclear order—characterized by clear rules, arms control agreements, and relatively stable deterrence—is eroding. More states are acquiring nuclear capabilities, and existing nuclear powers are modernizing their arsenals, increasing the risk of miscalculation and escalation. Narang and Vaddi highlight the weakening of arms control frameworks, such as the collapse of key treaties, and the emergence of new technologies that blur the line between conventional and nuclear warfare. They contend that the United States and its allies must adapt to this more volatile environment by strengthening deterrence, investing in missile defenses, and revitalizing diplomatic efforts to manage proliferation. The authors emphasize the need for innovative arms control initiatives and improved crisis communication channels to reduce the risks of accidental or inadvertent nuclear conflict. Ultimately, Narang and Vaddi warn that complacency is dangerous in the face of proliferating nuclear risks, and they call for a comprehensive, flexible strategy to ensure national and global security in an increasingly unpredictable nuclear age. (25 pages)

Beware the Europe You Wish For: The Downsides and Dangers of Allied Independence by Celeste A. Wallander (2025). Wallander examines the potential risks associated with a more independent European defense posture, separate from the United States and NATO. Wallander argues that while calls for European strategic autonomy are often motivated by a desire for burden-sharing and reduced American involvement, such independence could undermine the stability and effectiveness of the transatlantic alliance. She warns that a Europe acting independently might lack the military capabilities, coordination, and political unity necessary to deter common threats, potentially emboldening adversaries like Russia. Wallander also highlights the risk of divergence in threat perceptions and security priorities between the U.S. and Europe, which could weaken collective defense and reduce the credibility of deterrence. Furthermore, she notes that the process of building independent European defense structures could create bureaucratic duplication, waste resources, and strain diplomatic relations. Rather than pursuing separation, Wallander advocates for strengthening NATO and maintaining close U.S.-European cooperation. She concludes that allied unity and integrated defense planning are essential for addressing shared security challenges, and cautions against the unintended consequences of pursuing European independence in security affairs. The article ultimately underscores the importance of transatlantic solidarity for global stability. (20 pages).


What we’re re-reading given its importance today

 

Israel and the Bomb by Avner Cohen (1999). Israel and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive political history of Israel’s nuclear program, moving beyond speculation to draw on thousands of newly declassified American and Israeli documents and over one hundred interviews with key figures. Cohen reveals that Israel became a nuclear-armed state just before the 1967 Six-Day War, yet has maintained a deliberate policy of “opacity”—refusing to confirm or deny its nuclear capability. The book focuses on the pivotal period from 1950 to 1970, tracing how David Ben-Gurion’s vision for a nuclear Israel was realized. Cohen details the establishment of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in 1952, the crucial partnership with France for advanced technology, and the failure of U.S. intelligence to recognize the Dimona Project’s true purpose. He also examines the secret negotiations between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir that cemented Israel’s ambiguous nuclear stance. Cohen analyzes the strategic, political, and diplomatic reasons behind Israel’s secrecy, including fears of Arab reaction, domestic debate, and U.S. nonproliferation pressures. Israel and the Bomb illuminates the complexities of Israel’s nuclear history and policy, offering vital insights for those interested in nuclear proliferation, Middle Eastern politics, Israeli history, and U.S.-Israeli relations. (328 pages).

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N Waltz (2012). Sagan and Waltz present an influential discussion on the consequences of nuclear proliferation. The book is structured as a debate between two leading scholars with contrasting views. Waltz, representing the “proliferation optimist” perspective, argues that the spread of nuclear weapons can actually promote stability and peace. According to Waltz, nuclear-armed states are deterred from going to war due to the catastrophic consequences of nuclear conflict, making the world safer as more states acquire these weapons.In contrast, Sagan, the “proliferation pessimist,” contends that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of accidents, unauthorized use, and escalation during crises. Sagan emphasizes problems such as organizational failures, misperceptions, and the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of unstable regimes or non-state actors. The book explores historical case studies, theoretical arguments, and policy implications, offering readers a nuanced understanding of the nuclear proliferation debate. (288 pages).


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The listing herein of any non-LLNL publication does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. government or the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.