Recommended Reads

books

Issue 6 — 2026

What We’ve Been Reading (and Re-Reading) at CGSR Lately

Dive into the books/articles that have captured our attention recently. From thought-provoking reads to timeless favorites worth revisiting, here's a glimpse into what’s been on our "shelves" at CGSR.

Bureacracies at War

Bureacracies at War by Tyler Jost (2024). Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Jost examines how national security institutions shape the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders base their choice for conflict – which institutional designs provide the best counsel, why those institutions perform better, and why many leaders fail to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provide the best information also empower the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the road to war is often the tragic consequence of how leaders resolve the trade-off between good information and political security. Employing an original cross-national data set and detailed explorations of the origins and consequences of institutions inside China, India, Pakistan, and the United States, this book explores why bureaucracy helps to avoid disaster, how bureaucratic competition produces better information, and why institutional design is fundamentally political (408 pages). 

 

Polarization and International Politics

Polarization and International Politics: How Extreme Partisanship Threatens Global Stability by Rachel Myrick (2025). Polarization is a defining feature of politics in the United States and many other democracies. Yet although there is much research focusing on the effects of polarization on domestic politics, little is known about how polarization influences international cooperation and conflict. Democracies are thought to have advantages over nondemocratic nations in international relations, including the ability to keep foreign policy stable across time, credibly signal information to adversaries, and maintain commitments to allies. Does domestic polarization affect these “democratic advantages”? In this timely book, Rachel Myrick argues that polarization reshapes the nature of constraints on democratic leaders, which in turn erodes the advantages democracies have in foreign affairs. Drawing on a range of evidence, including cross-national analyses, observational and experimental public opinion research, descriptive data on the behavior of politicians, and interviews with policymakers, Myrick develops metrics that explain the effect of extreme polarization on international politics and traces the pathways by which polarization undermines each of the democratic advantages. Myrick’s account links the effects of polarization on democratic governance to theories of international relations, integrating work across the fields of international relations, comparative politics, and American politics to explore how patterns of domestic polarization shape the international system. (336 pages).

 

The Insiders' Game: How Elites Make War and Peace

The Insiders’ Game: How Elites Make War and Peace by Elizabeth N. Saunders (2024). One of the most widely held views of democratic leaders is that they are cautious about using military force because voters can hold them accountable, ultimately making democracies more peaceful. How, then, are leaders able to wage war in the face of popular opposition, or end conflicts when the public still supports them? The Insiders’ Game sheds light on this enduring puzzle, arguing that the primary constraints on decisions about war and peace come from elites, not the public. Saunders focuses on three groups of elites—presidential advisers, legislators, and military officials—to show how the dynamics of this insiders’ game are key to understanding the use of force in American foreign policy. She explores how elite preferences differ from those of ordinary voters, and how leaders must bargain with elites to secure their support for war. Saunders provides insights into why leaders start and prolong conflicts the public does not want, but also demonstrates how elites can force leaders to change course and end wars (344 pages).

 


Articles

 

 

Conventional Deterrence of Nuclear Useby Adam Mount (2025). Some academic literature and U.S. policy documents suggest that conventional deterrence is weaker than nuclear deterrence. But recent developments in U.S. policy suggest that conventional forces are assuming a larger role in deterring limited nuclear use. This article explores why and how U.S. officials may turn to conventional weapons to deter a nuclear attack. As conventional weapons are becoming increasingly capable of producing strategic effects in response to a nuclear attack, U.S. officials may be more likely to consider conventional deterrence as a credible option to deter those attacks. In some cases, U.S. officials are likely to prefer conventional options to avoid the costs, risks, and uncertainty of nuclear threats. To test the theory, the article presents the results of a series of individual, scenario-based “tabletop interviews” with former senior U.S. officials who might plausibly have been consulted on a decision about how to deter a North Korean nuclear attack. The results demonstrate that U.S. officials increasingly consider conventional deterrence of nuclear use to be a viable and valuable capability. (34 pages).

 

U.S. Space Power and Alliance Dynamics in the Cold War” by Aaron Bateman (2025). U.S. space power has long been anchored to terrestrial geography. In the Cold War, the United States depended on a global network of facilities to track and communicate with military, intelligence, and civilian satellites. But it was difficult to secure access to foreign territories that were both in view of satellites as they passed overhead and politically reliable. Drawing on declassified Australian, British, and U.S. documents, this article details the largely invisible role of allies in U.S. space power. To mitigate the political challenges associated with basing space facilities in non-allied countries, the United States turned to Australia and Britain. But using allied territories was not risk free. Postcolonial independence movements threatened the security of tenure at key U.S. space tracking stations located in British territories in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Australian concerns that U.S. space facilities were nuclear targets and violated Australia’s sovereignty created a domestic political uproar that strained the U.S.-Australia alliance. Political upheaval, even in allied states, was a significant vulnerability for U.S. space capabilities. Mitigating these political risks thus became a top U.S. foreign policy priority. (39 pages).

 

"Asia After America How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China” by Zach Cooper (2026).  The article argues that the U.S. “pivot to Asia” has effectively failed, because Washington never matched its ambitious rhetoric with the economic and governance investments needed to complement its military presence and counter China’s rise. Of the pivot’s three pillars, only security received sustained attention, while trade initiatives such as the TPP collapsed, protectionism grew, and democracy and anticorruption efforts either alienated partners or were abandoned, undermining U.S. credibility. As domestic divisions and global distractions limited American capacity, U.S. strategy quietly narrowed to defending a thin “first island chain” around Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, leaving much of South, Southeast, and mainland Asia to deepen ties with Beijing. The author contends that a broader, well resourced regional strategy is no longer realistic, so the United States will have to accept a form of retrenchment, focus on shoring up this narrower defensive line with close allies, and manage hard choices on alliances, nuclear issues, and deterrence, even though this may not be enough to prevent expanding Chinese influence (20 pages).

 

Allies and Access: Implications of an American Turn Away from Alliancesby Rachel Metz (with Austin Carson and Paul Poast).  A defining feature of the post-1945 international system is the American network of allies and partners that has underpinned its global power. Recent developments within the United States and in the international system have severely strained that alliance network. If it collapses, what is at stake? Existing scholarship in International Relations highlights losses in aggregated military capabilities, reduced diplomatic support, and lost trade. In this essay we review these benefits and another that has been overlooked: ally-enabled access. Access refers to permission from allies and partners to engage in military and intelligence missions within their borders on their territory, through their airspace, or in their territorial waters. Access via America’s allies and security partners has enabled Washington to use foreign sovereign spaces for military logistics, military operations, and foreign surveillance to overcome the tyranny of distance. Examples include permission from allies and partners in the Middle East to allow the US Air Force to fly from their bases to strike targets in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, and US intelligence installations built and operated by permission from Pakistani, Turkish, and Japanese territory during the Cold War. We describe the broad functions of alliances and show how access has been key to projection of American military and intelligence power at a global scale. Perhaps limiting or ending America’s global hegemonic role is desirable; perhaps it is dangerous. We argue that accounting for the contributions of access made by allies and security partners is critical if scholars, policymakers, and publics are to properly assess what is at stake in an American turn away from alliances.


What we’re re-reading given its importance today

 

Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict by Amy Oakes (2012). The very existence of diversionary wars is hotly contested in the press and among political scientists. Yet no book has so far tackled the key questions of whether leaders deliberately provoke conflicts abroad to distract the public from problems at home, or whether such gambles offer a more effective response to domestic discontent than appeasing opposition groups with political or economic concessions. Oakes addresses these questions by reinterpreting key historical examples of diversionary war—such as Argentina's 1982 Falklands Islands invasion and U.S. President James Buchanan's decision to send troops to Mormon Utah in 1857. It breaks new ground by demonstrating that the use of diversionary tactics is, at best, an ineffectual strategy for managing civil unrest, and draws important conclusions for policymakers—identifying several new, and sometimes counterintuitive, avenues by which embattled states can be pushed toward adopting alternative political, social, or economic strategies for managing domestic unrest. (280 pages). 

 

“Unthinkable and Tragic: The Psychology of Weapons Taboos in War” by Timothy Dolan (2013). Discussions of weapons taboos have failed to take into account the possibility that prescriptive international and national norms of behavior may come into conflict. Using psychological studies of trade-offs and protected values as a guide, this article argues that when these conflicts exist, the taboos' individual-level constraining effects can be vitiated. An analysis of General George Marshall's proposal to use chemical weapons against the Japanese in 1945 demonstrates that normative conflict can produce a readiness to violate weapons taboos. In these situations, state decisions to violate taboos may depend on the extent to which the perception of normative conflict is shared by other decision makers and society more generally (36 pages).     

 

The listing herein of any non-LLNL publication does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. government or the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.


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The listing herein of any non-LLNL publication does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. government or the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.