Abstract: How do shifts in nuclear rivalry affect conventional conflict? Foundational accounts, such as the Theory of the Nuclear Revolution and the Stability-Instability Paradox, focus narrowly on the balance of nuclear capabilities. We argue that a broader set of factors, including nuclear posture, leadership traits, and diplomatic channels, can affect perceptions of escalation risk and preferences for the use of conventional force under the nuclear shadow. We test existing theories and our novel hypotheses with two conjoint experiments fielded among U.S. military elites. We find that shifts to the nuclear balance affect attitudes in a manner consistent with the Theory of the Nuclear Revolution and contrary to classic renderings of the Stability-Instability Paradox. However, we find that other factors---less escalatory nuclear postures and cautious adversary leadership---contribute to stability-instability-like dynamics, simultaneously reducing perceived escalation risk and increasing support for conventional military action.

Michael Goldfien is an assistant professor in the National Security Affairs department at the U.S. Naval War College. Dr. Goldfien's research focuses on leadership and reputation in international relations, as well as nuclear politics. His work has been published in International Security, the American Political Science Review, Security Studies, the Journal of Politics, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution, among other outlets. He has been a fellow with the International Security Studies program at Yale, the Yale Nuclear Security Program, and the Notre Dame International Security Center. He holds a Ph.D. in political science with university distinction from Yale University, an M.A. in international policy from Stanford University, and a B.A. in international relations from Grinnell College.

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