Conventional Warfighting in a Nuclear-Armed World

A fundamental debate within the nuclear politics literature concerns why nuclear rivals engage in nuclear arms races with each other and the role of nuclear superiority in crisis bargaining. This debate has overlooked why nuclear states have engaged in intense conventional arms races and the role of the conventional military balance in crises between nuclear powers. In Swords and Shields: Conventional Warfighting in a Nuclear-Armed World, I provide a fuller understanding of these dynamics. I first examine when the threat to achieve conventional military success against an opponent's non-nuclear forces will yield a compellent success. I argue that such threats can compel a nuclear-armed adversary to make concessions when the challenger has an effective limited conventional option and a secure second-strike capability. The implication of this argument is that conventionally inferior states that see a nuclear rival gain a stronger nuclear retaliatory capability fear vulnerability to conventional compellence, and they prefer to redress this vulnerability by investing in conventional capabilities that can deny their rival the ability to win a quick victory. I test this argument with case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin Crises, the Kargil War, Operation Parakram, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War arms race. 

Tyler Bowen is an Assistant Professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the United States Naval War College whose work focuses on issues related to nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, and U.S. grand strategy. His current projects focus on the logic of escalation from conventional to nuclear war and the utility of conventional warfighting operations in crises with nuclear adversaries. His work has been published in the Journal of Politics, Texas National Security Review, and in an edited volume from MIT Press. He previously worked as a visiting professor at the United States Air Force Academy and a postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University in 2021. 

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