Sizing the U.S. Nuclear Force for Adversarial Multipolarity

Abstract: Changes in adversary nuclear forces have always been a key driver of U.S. force structure decisions. Thus, it is no surprise that in response to China’s nuclear expansion, questions about nuclear sufficiency are back at the forefront of the debate. While there is growing consensus in the strategic community that the current modernization program is insufficient, there is no agreement on the necessary size and composition of U.S. nuclear forces for adversarial multipolarity. But before we engage in these “numbers discussions,” we must first revisit the force sizing metrics that have traditionally informed decisions about nuclear sufficiency. Next, we must examine which of them are most relevant in the current context and what they imply in terms of qualitative and quantitative requirements. Over the past decade, many new gaps emerged between the United States and its adversaries which justifies certain adjustments in U.S. nuclear forces, however, not all gaps require a response, and not all responses need to be nuclear.

Anna Péczeli is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. She is also an affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. Her research focuses on U.S. nuclear posture, in particular the changes and continuities in U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War. Her research areas also include the future of arms control and strategic risk reduction in a multi-domain environment, extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, and NATO’s defense policy. Anna holds a PhD degree in International Relations from Corvinus University of Budapest.

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