2026 Speakers

Abstract: Russia, China, and North Korea have expanded their forces faster than the West, and each may perceive a narrowing window to act before American and allied conventional rearmament matures in the mid-2030s. Flexible theater nuclear forces can help to close that near-term gap by denying adversaries a nuclear trump card and undermining theories of victory that rest on limited escalation. Because the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile will not arrive until the 2030s, the United States should convert existing systems now, fielding nuclear variants of the Joint Air to Surface

Abstract: The United States’ shift from denying to accepting that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) applies to nuclear weapons legalized nuclear planning and reshaped its posture around distinction and proportionality. However, nuclear deterrence “creeds” continue to influence how the United States interprets these principles, allowing controversial targets to remain permissible. Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate

Abstract: Recent developments in Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization, the ever-closer politico-military cooperation between the two, and China’s emergence as a near nuclear peer have made the question of a potential nuclear decapitation strike by US adversaries more salient than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Although there is no dispositive evidence that either the PRC or Russia are contemplating a decapitation strike the development of these capabilities - Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems, ASATS among them - throws into stark relief the urgent need to modernize US NC3

Abstract: How do shifts in nuclear rivalry affect conventional conflict? Foundational accounts, such as the Theory of the Nuclear Revolution and the Stability-Instability Paradox, focus narrowly on the balance of nuclear capabilities. We argue that a broader set of factors, including nuclear posture, leadership traits, and diplomatic channels, can affect perceptions of escalation risk and preferences for the use of conventional force under the nuclear shadow. We test existing theories and our novel hypotheses with two conjoint experiments fielded among U.S. military elites. We find that shifts

Abstract: Has the shift in Washington's approach toward U.S. allies undermined NATO’s credibility? To address this critical question, we conducted a large, survey-based longitudinal study investigating changes in perceptions of NATO’s collective defense commitments across selected allied states (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, and Canada), the Russian Federation, and in the British and German parliaments. In line with our theory of retrenchment signaling, we found a dramatic decline in the credibility of the U.S. commitments to NATO during the first year of Trump’s

Abstract: The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense released its first National Blueprint for Biodefense in 2015. After releasing many additional topical reports thereafter, the Commission released another National Blueprint in 2024, updating the original Blueprint and serving as a compendium of the Commission’s recommendations across its previously published reports. The Commission - composed of former elected and appointed officials - continues to educate Congress about our findings and recommendations, and to date, Congress has taken up, or otherwise addressed, many of the Commission's

Abstract: Since the mid-2010s, scholars and analysts have declared the emergence of a dangerous ‘new’ or ‘third’ nuclear age. Beyond academia, the concept of the new nuclear age is proving influential with policymakers in a range of countries. The new nuclear age is understood to be characterized by technological change, nuclear multipolarity, eroding constraints on the behavior and competition of nuclear-armed states, and the likely emergence of new nuclear powers. That said, it remains unclear how we should understand the new nuclear age in broader terms: how new is it and does it require

Abstract: When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in June 2024, his first trip there in nearly 25 years, the ceremonial welcome was expected. More notable was the substance of his meeting with Kim Jong Un, which produced a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and formalized a military alliance between Russia and North Korea. By October 2024, about 11,000 North Korean troops had been deployed to Russia, mainly in Kursk; by late April 2025, South Korean intelligence estimated the total at around 15,000, with at least half still deployed. Today, Washington can still

Abstract: The nuclear proliferation landscape is in flux, marked by significant yet often unrecognized shifts in both the motivations and methods behind state pursuit of nuclear weapons. This project examines how the drivers of proliferation and pathways to weapons development have evolved over time, with particular attention to the changing role of the United States in mitigating global risk and the complex impact of emerging technologies on nuclear development. Ultimately, these dynamics have important implications for assessing state-level risk and for the set of policy tools the

Abstract: Following French President Emmanuel Macron’s March 2 speech at Île-Longue, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway have shown interest in additional European nuclear protection to complement U.S. extended deterrence. This marks a major shift for the Nordics, once strong advocates of disarmament, as they increasingly rely on nuclear deterrence amid growing uncertainty over U.S. commitments. The Nordic nuclear debate now spans the NATO umbrella, the idea of a “Nordic Nuke,” and Macron’s European deterrence model. This talk will examine these options and their potential to give the Nordics greater

A fundamental debate within the nuclear politics literature concerns why nuclear rivals engage in nuclear arms races with each other and the role of nuclear superiority in crisis bargaining. This debate has overlooked why nuclear states have engaged in intense conventional arms races and the role of the conventional military balance in crises between nuclear powers. In Swords and Shields: Conventional Warfighting in a Nuclear-Armed World, I provide a fuller understanding of these dynamics. I first examine when the threat to achieve conventional military success against an opponent's non

Abstract: The existential risks posed to the world by nuclear weapons are growing. Efforts to halt nuclear proliferation, manage crises, promote arms control, and build alliances are all considered fundamental to reducing the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe. Yet, no tool is guaranteed to succeed and some may even have unanticipated, counterproductive consequences for international security. In a field fixated on finding solutions, Atomic Backfires, edited by Stephen Herzog, Giles David Arceneaux, and Ariel F. W. Petrovics, provocatively takes the opposite tack. An impressive group of

Abstract: Polarization is a defining feature of politics in the United States and many other democracies. Yet although there is much research focusing on the effects of polarization on domestic politics, little is known about how polarization influences international cooperation and conflict. Democracies are thought to have advantages over nondemocratic nations in international relations, including the ability to keep foreign policy stable across time, credibly signal information to adversaries, and maintain commitments to allies. Does domestic polarization affect these “democratic advantages”

Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that innovation consistently improves military power by dramatically improving the effectiveness of a state's armed forces. Militaries that oppose innovation invite defeat, but those that innovate secure victory. This narrative is alluring and intuitive, but it is also wrong. Based on an in-progress book manuscript, Kendrick Kuo offers a conceptual approach that expands how we think about innovation's relationship to military effectiveness. He will also propose a framework for assessing risk profiles in military innovation based on the degree of creative

Abstract: The war in Ukraine, the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, and military competitions in Northeast Asia have raised the alarm about ‘nuclear threats.’ But how should decisionmakers and citizens distinguish serious nuclear threats that demand countervailing action, from nuclear threats that are mere noise aiming to manipulate nuclear anxiety without a serious threat? The less precise our nuclear discourse, the more fear nuclear manipulators can elicit. The challenge, or imperative, is to judge correctly in real time whether and when a decisionmaker is really on the verge of ordering

Abstract: Europe must urgently confront a new nuclear reality. In recent years, Russia’s nuclear-backed revisionism has reintroduced nuclear coercion and the threat of nuclear escalation to the continent, underscoring the importance of credible nuclear deterrence. At the same time, Europe’s traditional reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence appears politically more fragile than at any point since the Cold War. Together, these developments require Europeans to think about their nuclear options. Based on the report of the European Nuclear Study Group, presented at the Munich Security

Abstract: Former Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, known for his awkward speaking style, once said: “we wanted to make it better, but it turned out as always.” Russia’s war with Ukraine is a perfect match for Chernomyrdin’s most famous quote. Having launched the war falsely claiming that Ukraine posed an intolerable threat to its security, Russia will emerge from it less secure, more resentful, and more threatening to Europe than before the war. Its threat perceptions, shaped by geography, new weapons technologies, and an upheaval in transatlantic relations, will cast a long shadow

Abstract: The Russia-Ukraine war is the first since the fall of the Soviet Union in which two major nuclear powers have found themselves on opposing sides of a high-intensity war, even if only indirectly. At the strategic level, the war offers four key lessons for the United States. First, the risk of an adversary using nuclear weapons is real and cannot be dismissed. Second, even under the nuclear shadow, protracted and highly destructive conventional war remains possible. Third, escalation thresholds are not fixed in advance; they emerge through ongoing contestation and tacit bargaining

Abstract: Why do adversaries sometimes cooperate to restrain their military competition? Why do they design arms control agreements with intrusive verification in some cases but rely on minimal transparency in others? Amidst ongoing international competition, arms control remains rare despite potential mutual benefits, and agreements vary dramatically in their approaches to monitoring. This book reveals how uncertainty from domestic political changes - such as leadership transitions or social unrest - can enable arms control. It identifies two paths to agreement: during periods of uncertainty

Abstract: Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Bureaucracies at Warexamines how national security institutions shaped the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders based their choices for conflict — which institutional designs provided the best counsel, why those institutions performed better, and why many leaders failed to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provided the best information also empowered the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the

Abstract: This talk focuses on security cooperation in the form of wartime access—decisions by states to let other states fight wars from inside their borders. It will discuss how wartime access helps the United States to mitigate the tyranny of distance and project power around the world, and will demonstrate the centrality of wartime access to the wars the United States' has waged since WWII, as well as to the war the United States military prepares to fight in a hypothetical Taiwan invasion scenario. Although permissive wartime access has been a defining feature of the post-1945 world

Abstract: For years, the United States has tried to put China front and center, from the rebalance to more recent calls for prioritization. Yet it has never truly reconciled the limits of a one-major-war force with the reality of a multi-theater, multi-rival world—let alone a world in which U.S. rivals across different regions have growing incentives to support one another. In Breaking the Double Bind: U.S. Defense Strategy and Multi-Theater Deterrence, CSBA’s Vice President for Research and Studies, Evan Montgomery, argues that the Pentagon should downgrade its emphasis on denial of a Taiwan

Abstract: In an era of seemingly ever-increasing global tensions, technology competition is often mentioned as a pathway for U.S. and allied success. And yet, beyond doing more across the board regarding technology competition is not at all simple. First, it is a concept increasingly muddled together with other big issues such as innovation policy, national defense strategy, great power competition, allied cooperation, public-private partnerships, and a host of other issues. Second, it is inherently dynamic, an action-reaction cycle between multiple players. Third, there are limits to what you

Abstract: Economics has been weaponized on a global scale, driving it to be an active domain of statecraft with strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. Throughout US history, American policymakers have acknowledged that economic security is national security and today the two are enmeshed more than ever. Critically interdependent global markets, supply chains, and information flows are wound tightly by technology-enabled networks at a scale never experienced across human history. This brings new risks and vulnerabilities. Economics is therefore no longer solely a lever of national

Abstract: China is rapidly improving its military capabilities, transforming the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into an increasingly sophisticated and capable force. How China continues to develop its military power, how it thinks about the use of force, and how it seeks to employ military means to achieve broader political and strategic objectives will significantly shape global security and international politics in the decades to come. This presentation, based on a report by the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), will discuss how military power can be studied in general and with a

Abstract: Since the mid-2010s, the collapse of key arms control treaties between great powers has unraveled the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, heightening nuclear risks to Europe. At the same time, a fresh movement emerged, calling for the total abolition of nuclear weapons, due to their catastrophic humanitarian consequences. European policy-makers found themselves between a rock and a hard place – between the global strategic conundrum calling for growing attention to nuclear deterrence, and domestic audiences demanding just the opposite. Europe's Nuclear Umbrella is about

Abstract: Rapidly evolving drone technology is being used worldwide, from aerial photography to package delivery services, in agricultural uses and in aiding search and rescue missions after a natural disaster. Drones have also become a key tool in modern warfare and in the work of first responders. They are being acquired and used by criminals and other malicious actors which poses enhanced security threats. As drones are increasingly weaponised and incorporate enhanced AI features, public concerns about drones and calls for legal frameworks and regulations of drones are increasing. This

Abstract: At present, the speed of AI advancement outstrips current governance mechanisms. Advancing common understanding among all AI stakeholders – from governments to commercial developers to independent researchers – is imperative to the successful integration of assessment and verification measures. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides a mature, technical precedent for nuclear-focused, multilateral verification. This research does not argue for or against an “IAEA for AI” – a topic widely covered in existing literature – but assesses specific verification tools and

Abstract: This lecture describes how President Barack Obama and his administration used the negotiation and ratification of an arms control treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), as a vehicle for advancing one of the president’s primary foreign policy objectives, a reset of U.S. relations with Russia. Specifically, it examines the administration’s efforts to move from the president’s strategic vision for arms control to defining that vision as a policy priority and ultimately, successfully negotiating what the president deemed the first and most important element of the

Abstract: Mallory Stewart will discuss the Administration’s decision not to engage with Russia’s proposal for a one-year extension of the political caps. This will include the stated reasons, Russian and Chinese responses, and the challenges and potential opportunities that lie ahead. Mallory Stewart is the Chief Executive Officer of The Council on Strategic Risks. Her areas of expertise include weapons of mass destruction law and policy, missile defense, outer space security policy, and risk management regarding emerging and disruptive technologies. From 2022 to 2025, she served as the

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has provided technical input to the long process that led to the negotiation and signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This talk will provide an overview of that history as well as insight based on personal engagement into some of the significant events. Discussion will include the Congressionally mandated moratorium on nuclear testing (the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchel amendment to the 1993 Energy and Water Appropriation), the formation of the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SBSS), the “Confidence Conference” held in June 1995

Abstract: Over the past 75 years, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has been central to alliance security in Europe and Asia. That system now faces mounting strain as multiple adversaries expand and modernize their nuclear forces and as U.S. strategic priorities shift, raising serious questions about the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. guarantees. This lecture will trace the evolution of U.S. strategic thought on extended deterrence and assesses four broad options for the future: reducing commitments, expanding guarantees, maintaining the status quo, or sharing deterrence responsibilities

Abstract: Changes in adversary nuclear forces have always been a key driver of U.S. force structure decisions. Thus, it is no surprise that in response to China’s nuclear expansion, questions about nuclear sufficiency are back at the forefront of the debate. While there is growing consensus in the strategic community that the current modernization program is insufficient, there is no agreement on the necessary size and composition of U.S. nuclear forces for adversarial multipolarity. But before we engage in these “numbers discussions,” we must first revisit the force sizing metrics that have

Abstract: We are entering a new age. That new age is dominated by two major powers – the United States and China – and a rising number of countries able to protect and assert themselves as well as influence, even shape the course of international events. That new age is thus increasingly multipolar and different from the bipolar age of the Cold War, which was ruled by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the unipolar age of the post-Cold War, which had Washington at the helm. Its key feature is strategic autonomy. That new age has far-reaching implications for the United States, and

Abstract: In an era of great power competition and a worsening security environment, the nuclear ban treaty might appear to be at risk of irrelevance. Yet ignoring the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) would come with risks to extended nuclear deterrence and the nuclear order for the United States and its allies and partners. This volume offers an original and in-depth examination of the theories, politics, and debates involved in the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons conferences and negotiation of the TPNW. There are numerous histories of the TPNW, however they have