China’s Arms Control

Abstract: Many scholars assume that classical arms control theory, derived from U.S.-Soviet experiences, is universal. But China—being the weaker party in an asymmetric nuclear relationship—has developed its own distinct tradition. China's arms control tradition seeks to safeguard national defense modernization, prioritize developing military capabilities over reassurance and risk reduction, and maintain a high level of secrecy. This approach faces new challenges as China's nuclear capabilities increase. Through nuclear learning, China needs to update its core beliefs regarding arms control, shifting from seeing it as a means to restrain China to emphasizing the shared interest among nuclear powers and the value of reassurance in preventing nuclear war and arms races. Maintaining strategic stability within an asymmetric nuclear force structure is a new challenge for both China and the United States. To foster nuclear learning, Washington should exercise restraint in its strategic capabilities, Beijing should adopt an interagency arms control decision-making mechanism, and both sides should continue to engage in nuclear dialogues. 

Riqiang Wu is a Professor of International Relations at Tsinghua University, China. His research combines political and technical approaches, focusing on nuclear arms control, space security, and emerging technologies. Previously, he taught at Renmin University of China and worked at the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation as a missile engineer. He held visiting fellowships at Harvard University, Dartmouth College, Stanford University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He got his Ph.D. in political science from Tsinghua University, and M.Sc. and B.E. both from Harbin Institute of Technology.

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