Intra-conflict Deterrence and Escalation Management in a Contested Indo-Pacific

Abstract: If China decides to attempt to forcibly annex Taiwan and the United States elects to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, two of the world’s largest nuclear powers may become engaged in armed conflict in the western Pacific. This potential scenario raises critical questions about how Washington can prevent Beijing from escalating the conflict up to the nuclear threshold and, if these efforts are unsuccessful, how to restore nuclear deterrence in the midst of a hot war.

Justin Anderson is the deputy director at National Defense University's Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, where he is responsible for developing the Center’s programs and leads its research, policy support, and education initiatives on nuclear issues. His research focuses on deterrence (nuclear and non-nuclear), extended deterrence and allied assurance, nuclear forces, and future nuclear arms control agreements and confidence-building measures.

Chris Andrews is a policy fellow at National Defense University's Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. His research focuses on nuclear deterrence, nuclear forces, and the future of nuclear crisis relationships among strategic competitors. He is especially interested in the effect of China's expanding and modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities on security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region and how U.S. strategy and planning should reflect such dynamics.

Technical Contact: Brad Roberts            
Event Manager: Katie Thomas, thomas94 [at] llnl.gov (thomas94[at]llnl[dot]gov)