2025 Speakers

Abstract: China has a sophisticated and well-resourced cyber warfare program and has compromised critical infrastructure in the U.S. and around the world. U.S. law and policy have historically constrained U.S. government directly defending critical power, water and pipeline networks which are almost entirely owned and operated by the private sector. Yet Americans expect their water to be clean, their lights to be on and their trains to run. Could AI generated digital twins of critical infrastructure be a way to bridge public and private efforts to find and fix vulnerabilities in the nation’s

Abstract: The dramatic worsening of the international security environment following Russia’s two invasions of Ukraine, and China’s decision to dramatically grow their nuclear forces poses a serious challenge to U.S. national security strategy writ large, and to U.S. nuclear strategy in particular. Formulating a U.S. strategy to address the impending two peer threat environment is necessary if the nation is to ensure that it has the nuclear forces necessary to enable our strategy in the mid 2030s. The most urgent imperative is to augment U.S. theater nuclear forces. Our current and planned

Abstract: The lecture focuses on how Russian military thinkers interpret and operationalize the threat perceptions defined by the country’s political leadership. This presentation argues that although Russian operations in Ukraine reveal a degree of adaptability, the war has not reshaped Russia’s broader framework of threat perceptions. Rather than introducing fundamentally new assessments, current military discourse tends to reinterpret established concerns through the lens of ongoing conflict. In effect, Russia’s experience in Ukraine has not altered Russia’s security anxieties but has

Abstract: Most observers depict innovation in the Russia-Ukraine War as extraordinarily dynamic, rapid, and ever-present. While this may be true at the tactical level of war, is it true of Russian military strategic and operational thinking? Is operational thought experiencing the same rapid evolution as tactical thought? How the Russia-Ukraine War changing how military elites in Russia approach the problem of fighting a regional or even global conflict against NATO? Mike Petersen will discuss the state of Russian military operational art among Russian military elites, and how those elites

This presentation, based on a recently published RAND report, will analyze how Russian strategic culture shapes the country’s nuclear posture, with a particular focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs).

With China as the pacing challenge and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as the pacing scenario, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management as it considers its approach to prosecuting a hypothetical future conflict with China.

China views tensions and competition with the West, especially the United States, as inevitable due to its rising economic and political power and conflicting strategic objectives, prompting the development of a deterrence strategy called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) to guide political and military decisions during crises.

If China decides to attempt to forcibly annex Taiwan and the United States elects to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, two of the world’s largest nuclear powers may become engaged in armed conflict in the western Pacific.

The potential emergence of artificial general intelligence (AGI) is plausible and should be taken seriously by the U.S. national security community. Yet the pace and potential progress of AGI's emergence.

The time has come for the United States to build a collective defense pact in Asia. For decades, such a pact was neither possible nor necessary. Today, in the face of a growing threat from China, it is both viable and essential.

An old debate has been given new life by the changing security environment. This is the debate about whether US nuclear deterrence strategy should continue to have a significant counterforce component.

China's grand strategy under Xi offers great resemblance to the traditional international relations structure and system of the Middle Kingdom historically.

While South Korea remains a non-nuclear U.S. ally under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, domestic support for developing its own independent nuclear weapons is high and growing.

Mr. Inglis will describe the current state of digital infrastructure in a world increasingly dependent on it.

Adversary cooperation and opportunism is growing to such an extent between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran that it is no longer sufficient label China “the pacing threat.”

Markus Garlauskas will discuss the GUARDIAN TIGER effort on deterring, preparing for and countering limited nuclear attacks in East Asia, with allies and partners.

Divergent assessments about the nature of China’s strategic relationships and how much military and security cooperation a given relationship will support are largely due to conceptual confusion about how to think about alliances and strategic alignment.

The United States and its partners face an authoritarian axis that spans the Eurasian landmass.

Ankit Panda joins CGSR to discuss his new book, ‘The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon’, and the changing landscape of nuclear security and strategy.

Former NSC China Director Matt Turpin will discuss outlines of U.S. China policy as the rivalry between Beijing and Washington has taken center stage in U.S. policymaking over the past decade.

How can states use military force to achieve their political aims without triggering a catastrophic nuclear war? How has China coped with this dilemma?

Post-Cold War homeland missile defense strategy has focused on defending against ballistic missile threats from rogue states.

This article draws on the stability-instability paradox to compare the prospect for limited war between the United States and China to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry Cold War.

How does nuclear technology influence international relations? While many books focus on countries armed with nuclear weapons, this volume puts the spotlight on those that have the technology to build nuclear bombs but choose not to.

How will the war in Ukraine end? Where will U.S.-Russian relations go next? How should we think about Moscow’s role in the so-called “axis” with Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing? What comes next in Russia after President Putin leaves the scene? What is the true state of the Russian economy? Is there a hope for nuclear arms control with Moscow in this administration? Given all of the big questions out there at the moment, this is an opportune time to welcome in a renowned expert for an informal, off-the-record conversation on all things Russia. Mr. Matthew Rojansky, President and Chief Executive

The session will provide fresh insights into strategic competition and superpower dynamics by examining China's strategy, intentions, and decision-making calculus.

Although the Unites States and its allies may yet dissuade Iran from getting the bomb, policymakers need to consider the kind of force that it might build if it succeeds in crossing the nuclear threshold.

At the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi Jinping called on the People’s Liberation Army to build a “strong system of strategic deterrence.”

Whatever “nuclear order” existed through the 20th century has now come nearly undone.