Separating the Signal from the Nuclear Noise in Russia: Russia's Political-Military Establishment Debates Credibility of Nuclear Threats and Potential Nuclear Employment

Abstract:  In light of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine since 2022, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has degraded significantly, and escalation risks have increased. NATO Allies are committed to supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia, while maintaining nuclear deterrence, managing escalation, and preparing for conflict if deterrence fails. NATO is deepening its understanding of Russian strategic behavior and its appreciation for the complexity of multi-domain deterrence across hybrid, conventional, and nuclear domains. This discussion will address the key components of NATO nuclear deterrence, what NATO is doing to strengthen deterrence, and how to manage escalation risk On September 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered a soft launch of impending changes to Russia’s public nuclear doctrine. The following brief argues that these impending changes are an outgrowth of a debate in Russia’s nuclear ecosystem about what Moscow could do to improve its coercive reputation.  Moscow’s proposed clarifications to its nuclear doctrine likely constitutes a shift to how Russia approaches signaling in the context of the war.  Faced with the perceived shortcomings of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine war, particularly over the issue of Western military assistance to Kyiv, Russia’s political leadership, military analysts, and civilian experts have grappled with the question of how to make Russia’s threats more credible in a lively debate. The emerging consensus among these communities is that Moscow must employ more assertive and creative measures when it comes to its nuclear signaling to compel the West and show how far it is willing to go accomplish its goals in Ukraine. In this brief, we lay out Russian perspectives on the challenges and utility of nuclear weapons in its military strategy and identify areas of emerging consensus in Russian elites building on previous work on these issues completed by analysts in the CNA Russia Studies Program. These are not meant to be predictive of the Kremlin’s behavior as the war continues, but present areas of emerging consensus on what kind of actions Russia might carry out next to support its thinly veiled nuclear threats. The ideas presented in this article are the salient views, but they are in no way linear nor static among the three stakeholders examined.  Our overview is supported on a recent report led by Anya Fink that looks at Russian leadership, military thinkers, and civilian commentator engagement with nuclear issues after February 2022.

Gabriela I. Rosa Hernandez is an analyst with the Russia Studies Program at CNA. Her recent research has focused on Russian strategic thought, security orders, conventional and nuclear arms control in Europe, and the Russian military. 

Cornell Overfield is an analyst with the Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs Team at CNA. His recent research has focused on improved engagements with partners in Europe, maritime policy, and artic security.

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