Adapting deterrence strategies to a changing security environment
Wednesday 20 – Saturday 23 June 2018 | WP1610

Annotated bibliography
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Key questions posed for the workshop:
1. How are the U.S. and its allies adapting their deterrence strategies to the evolving security environment? Are they converging or diverging?
2. Is the balance of strategic influence shifting favourably or unfavourably in Europe and Asia?
3. What can be done to accelerate deterrence transformation and improved strategic competitiveness

Wilton Park is hosting eight panels over two days:

Panel 1: The NATO Brussels Summit and the future of deterrence adaptation
Panel 2: The search for modern deterrence: evolving P-3 strategies
Panel 3: Extended deterrence in comparative global perspective
Panel 4: The nuclear deterrence taboo and Europe’s nuclear future
Panel 5: The balance of strategic influence in Europe: shifting in whose favour?
Panel 6: The balance of strategic influence in Northeast Asia: shifting in whose favour?
Panel 7: Priorities for bolstering deterrence and improving competitiveness
Panel 8: Evaluation Survey
Panel 9: On balancing deterrence, competition, and cooperation

Reports from previous workshops at Wilton Park

The list of readings below provides some overview and background for the topics covered in the workshop. While some references are to book or materials not available online, where possible references include links to accessible versions of articles.

In association with:
Panel 1: The NATO Brussels Summit and the future of deterrence adaptation

Key questions:

• With the Brussels Summit imminent, what results can be expected on deterrence?
• What has NATO's search for a coherent deterrence strategy produced?
• What further adaptation of the Alliance’s deterrence posture is necessary and appropriate today?


Durkalec assesses the implications of the 2018 NPR and examines NATO's broader post-Cold War trajectory as well as future prospects for arms control. In the context of the upcoming Brussels Summit, Durkalec notes several realistic ambitions for NATO allies including "specific language" concerning the challenge posed by Russia that reflects a changing global landscape, efforts to bolster nuclear sharing arrangements, and "reaffirmation" of NATO's statements regarding arms control and disarmament.


This report, led by General (retd.) John R. Allen, provides a series of recommendations to NATO members as they review their common strategy in July 2018. Among them, the report recommends that members innovate as an Alliance, forge new industrial partnerships to “equip NATO for the future of war,” and develop a principled engagement with Russia and Ukraine.


Marmei and Praks outline the key issues to be discussed during the Brussels Summit. Specifically, the paper calls attention to issues of rapid reinforcement, burden-sharing, military mobility, and cyber defense that they argue are likely to be central. The paper also delves more deeply into security issues in the Baltic region.


Ringsmose and Rynning focus on the strategic challenge posed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and considers NATO’s various pathways forward. Specifically, the authors argue that NATO is “at a fork in the road” amid the significant challenge of deterring further Russian aggression without inadvertently provoking Moscow.


Roberts argues that the upcoming Brussels Summit is perhaps the most important in the Alliance’s recent history. The article privileges the potential for achieving ratification of a new concept to enable SACEUR to deter and defend against threats in “mainland continental Europe, the North Atlantic, and the High North.” The article also makes clear the importance of creating new, high-readiness forces to react quickly to events on the ground given current deployment timelines under the existing Graduated Response Plans.


The authors here note, like Marmei and Praks, the importance enhancing mobility, readiness, and decision-making processes of NATO forces as the Alliance deals with terrorist, cyber, and hybrid threats. They also advocate for the creation of two new NATO commands focused on maritime and logistics and for the possible creation of a Black Sea Maritime Initiative led by the five Black Sea navies.
Panel 2: The search for modern deterrence: evolving P-3 strategies

Key questions:

- The United States, United Kingdom, and France have recently reviewed and updated their thinking about the requirements of deterrence in a changing security environment. What are the main elements of continuity and change in their policies and approaches to deterrence?
- Are there significant areas of divergence? If so, how can they best be managed?
- Is their thinking driving a wider NATO discussion? If not, what should be done?


Champschesnel examines the continuities and changes in the U.S. nuclear posture following the publication of the NPR, focusing on an assessment of U.S. convergence with French nuclear doctrine. She argues that both the United States and France continue to recognize the importance of alliance relationships and that there is more continuity and convergence than is commonly acknowledged.


Lewis and Tertrais outline the benefits and context of trilateral nuclear cooperation as the U.S., UK, and France face the challenge of “growing assertiveness from nuclear-armed countries.” The article also points to past challenges of tripartite deterrence—pointing to the failure to properly respond to Syrian’s use of chemical weapons—that the three must address in order to move forward. The article goes on to argue for complementary rather than homogenized approaches to deterrence given the unique capabilities of each state.


This document outlines France’s strategic posture in “an unstable and uncertain strategic environment.” It pays particular attention to the challenges posed by disruptive technologies.


This document outlines the 5-year national security strategy of the United Kingdom. Section 1.11 specifically notes the renewal of the UK’s nuclear deterrence.


The 2018 NPR outlines the United States’ nuclear posture in the wake of a more “diverse and advanced nuclear-threat environment.”
Panel 3: Extended deterrence in comparative global perspective

Key questions:

• Changes in the security environment have put US allies in Europe and Northeast Asia in the nuclear cross-hairs of regional challengers, at the same time that the nuclear ban movement has politically complicated life under the US nuclear umbrella. How are allies adjusting their deterrence strategies to new requirements?

• What lessons do allies in Europe region draw from the experience of allies in Northeast Asia, and vice versa?

• What can be done to strengthen confidence in the credibility and effectiveness of the US nuclear guarantee?


This workshop summary outlines developments in the extended deterrence relationships between the United States and its partners in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It outlines conversations concerning deployed capabilities in both theaters and notes the contemporary challenges facing U.S. partners in the two regions. It concludes by acknowledging the interconnected nature of extended deterrence commitments across both theaters and the importance of thinking about “extended deterrence in cross-regional terms.”


Murano examines Japan’s balancing act as it weighs its desire for nuclear disarmament against immediate security imperatives and its alliance with the United States.


This document provides a summary of key insights from a conference involving approximately 40 policy-makers and scholars. The conference linked the deterrence challenges the United States faces from regional powers with its leveraging of extended deterrence commitments to European and Asian partners. The participants emphasized the importance of tailoring extended deterrence to the specific regional context and national requirements of each partner and, like the follow-up conference listed above (Durkalec 2018), noted the connections between the extended deterrence relationships in both Europe and Asia.


Tsuruoka focuses on the challenges posed to Japan’s long-term security by Russia’s foreign policy in Crimea and increased NATO-Russian competition given the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. The article also examines the U.S.-Japan alliance and considers how it might be transformed to reflect the changing security environment.
Panel 4: The nuclear deterrence taboo and Europe’s nuclear future

Key questions:

- In many Western countries, a taboo has formed that inhibits discussion of deterrence and nuclear weapons. It has been reinforced by ICAN’s strategy of shaming countries cooperating with the United States on nuclear deterrence. What should and can be done?
- What are the consequences of failing to create a more balanced public discourse? How might that be done?
- What can the experiences of Japan and South Korea contribute to Europe’s exploration of possible pathways forward?


Grand argues that NATO must enhance both its conventional and nuclear capabilities in the context of the changing Euro-Atlantic security environment. In upcoming summits, Grand calls for clear messaging of NATO’s nuclear policy, efforts to foster nuclear debate within the Alliance, and clear warnings to adversaries that nuclear use would fundamentally alter the dynamics of any confrontation.


Ifft outlines the diverging views among several states concerning the need for a general prohibition of nuclear weapons in the form of a ban treaty. The article examines the drivers of support for the ban amid stalled progress toward nuclear disarmament. Ifft goes on to outline the various challenges associated with pursuing a ban, arguing that “going to low levels or zero without effective verification and agreed elimination procedures would be highly dangerous.”


Kamp argues that while NATO reacted swiftly and decisively to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, bolstering conventional deterrence, a discussion of the implications for the Alliance’s nuclear strategy has been lagging. He concludes that, regarding the conundrum of “how” to deter “whom” with “what”, although it has become clear that the addressee of NATO’s declaratory policy is Russia, the “what” – i.e. the nuclear posture in Europe and in the United States – and the way of how to combine the how, whom and what with a coherent and credible deterrence concept still require answers.


Kroenig outlines a range of options available to NATO to bolster its position in light of a Russia that has placed an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons in its military strategy and doctrine. These options include numerous nuclear and nonnuclear alternatives, which are subsequently assessed based on several factors including capability, escalation control, burden sharing, and cost effectiveness. He concludes that the most promising option is for NATO to equip its Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) with a nuclear-armed, air-to-surface cruise missile.


Thränert considers the ramifications of a withdrawal of U.S. security commitments from Europe and the strategic challenge that this would pose to NATO members. He argues that substitution of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees via the extension of nuclear umbrellas by European NWS—France and the United Kingdom—remains unlikely from both the demand and supply side.


Volpe and Kühn examine the reinvigoration of Germany’s security apparatus. Specifically, they analyze three nuclear options debated among a small circle of German policy-makers and academics: “(1) fielding an indigenous
nuclear force; (2) preserving a latent hedge capacity; or (3) cooperating with the French to open an extended nuclear deterrence umbrella over Europe.” The article concludes that all three options represent poor policy options given the high risks associated with them but goes on to argue that the reinvigoration of the nuclear debate is symptomatic of a rising Germany with consequences for both Europe and the international order.


Published prior to the conclusion of the Ban Treaty process, Williams’ article examines the reinvigorated debate concerning nuclear ethics following the rise of the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative. Importantly, the article points to the key differences between arguments to ban nuclear weapons and past efforts to ban other types of military technology and concludes that the HINW movement ought to “abandon the ban” in favor of initiatives to revive the NPT process and the Conference on Disarmament while giving voice to those states frustrated by the lack of progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

**Panel 5: The balance of strategic influence in Europe: shifting in whose favour?**

Key questions:

- Russia is competing to strengthen its political, military, and economic position vis-à-vis the West, while NATO and the European Union have sought to protect their positions by adjusting to new challenges and the United States has set out a more competitive approach. From Moscow’s perspective, how is the balance shifting?

- Do Western capitals share this assessment or take a different view?


Ball examines how and why Russia is extensively employing information warfare to ensure regime survival and in the service of its increasingly aggressive foreign policy goals. A theme throughout is how the West has yet to grasp the full implications of the Russian word *informatsia* and the challenge posed by Putin’s information strategy. The author concludes by arguing that Russia will continue to employ information warfare at an increasing rate as long as the strategy remains successful.


This report discusses the evolution of Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin, focusing on identifying challenges Russia poses to the stability of Europe and the North Atlantic alliance. The authors argue that countering the challenges of this new strategic situation requires enhanced NATO capabilities and deterrence posture. This can be achieved through U.S. leadership and increased defense resources from all members of NATO.


This study seeks to provide an understanding of Russian strategic motivations and objectives as well as the tools it uses to advance its goals. In addition, it seeks to lay out a comprehensive strategy for securing U.S. and transatlantic interests in the face of the challenge posed by Russia. Chapter 3 discusses Russian instruments of power, while U.S. and allied instruments of power are the subject of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 explores options for responding to the challenge posed by Russia. Notably, the study argues that the Western response to the Russia challenge thus far remains far removed from what it should be.


Palmer analyzes Russian military exercises to assess the role of high commands in preparing for theater operations and large-scale military exercises in Russian military practice. He provides three key insights: Russian
force posture is optimized for high readiness, prompt mobilization, and quick movement; the scale and frequency of Russian theater-level exercises are unmatched in Europe and have created a new strategic baseline; and Russian military practices can be viewed as an extension and adaptation of Soviet military practices.


Trenin posits that the current security environment in Europe is the result of the failure to properly include Russia in the regional security system. He argues that efforts to increase European security should focus on: preventing direct military conflict between Russia and NATO; increasing cooperation where interests overlap; de-escalating the conflict in Donbas; resolving tensions in the South Caucasus and Moldova; cooperating towards a political settlement in Syria; preventing further NATO enlargement; and recognizing that long-term security will depend on the global security environment.


Tsafos calls upon Europe and the U.S. to separate gas from the other challenges posed by Russia, arguing that doing so will boost energy security, protect and strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and allow for increased focused on issues where the West can resist Russian power more meaningfully. He supports this position with three key points: energy does not give Russia as much power as is usually assumed; an antagonistic strategy is unlikely to succeed or be sustained in bringing about change; and the best response to Russian gas is a set of policies that Europe should pursue anyway and that are unrelated to Russia.


Wallander argues that U.S.-Russian strategic stability can no longer be sustained through MAD in the twenty-first century, which has witnessed a transformation in military technology that alters the logic of MAD as mutually understood in the context of the Cold War and a transformation in global security relations away from the bipolar model of the second half of the twentieth century. She observes that the U.S. conception of strategic stability places emphasis on changing global security relations while the Russian perception emphasizes changes in military technology. Wallander concludes by recommending efforts be made to bridge this divide by conceptualizing strategic stability through the logic of Mutually Assured Stability (MAS), which she defines as “a condition in which neither party has the intention or capability to exercise unilateral advantage for political or military exploitation through preemptive coercion or military strike in such a way that precludes response, negotiation, or compromise.”


Zysk posits that the 2018 NPR makes an accurate assessment of Russian military strategy, arguing that the “defensive” nature of Russian military doctrine, its increasing emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence, and the emphasis placed on the initial period of war forsee the limited use of nuclear weapons. Zysk supports this argument with analysis of Russian strategic concepts and doctrine; defense procurement and deployments; and operational patterns in military exercises and training.

Panel 6: The balance of strategic influence in Northeast Asia: shifting in whose favour?

Key questions:

- China too is competing to strengthen its overall position, regionally and globally, while the United States, Japan, and South Korea have adopted similar but not identical strategies for meeting the China challenge. North Korea’s emergence as a nuclear-arming competitor has complicated the landscape. How do leaders in Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington assess the balance and its future prospects?

- What implications might a shifting balance in Asia have for Europe?

This unofficial conference report discusses U.S. and Chinese perspectives on the strategic nuclear dimension of their bilateral relationship, focusing on strategic stability, deterrence and reassurance, nonproliferation, and nuclear safety and security. One key takeaway from the conference is that China perceives U.S. ballistic missile defense systems as detrimental to strategic stability. Notably, the report highlights that some Chinese participants did not express concern about the risks of nuclear use by North Korea, Russia, or Pakistan or through inadvertent escalation. From a U.S. perspective, it was noted that Washington has not publicly recognized mutual vulnerability with China in part because of fears among U.S. allies that such a move would embolden China in the region.


This conference report explores U.S., South Korean, and Japanese concerns about North Korea’s growing capacity to conduct discrete attacks on its regional adversaries and the new challenges this poses for deterrence. It also discusses the additional challenge posed by North Korean ICBM capabilities, focusing in particular on the negative impact of U.S. rhetoric, namely the description of North Korean ICBM development as “a strategic game changer,” on both allied and adversarial perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence commitments.


This study highlights key points that emerged from discussions between U.S., Chinese, and Japanese security experts about the dynamics of U.S.-China strategic stability, focusing in particular on the role of Japan in that relationship. It identifies four interconnected areas that might frustrate attempts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.-China relations or U.S. alliance concerns: conventional-nuclear, regional-intercontinental linkage; the role of Japan; perceptions of mutual vulnerability; and the role of North Korea.


This article discusses the dualism of Xi Jinping’s approach to Southeast Asia, exploring what appears to be a contradictory fluctuation between a moderate and cooperative posture and a posture emphasizing Chinese power. The authors explore this dualism in the context of the first four months of 2018, which saw moderate rhetoric emphasizing cooperation with Southeast Asia at the National People’s Congress as well as the largest naval review in China’s history.
Panel 7: Priorities for bolstering deterrence and improving competitiveness

Key questions:

• What more should the United States and its allies do to strengthen deterrence and competitiveness?

• Looking ahead 5-10 years, can they improve their relative position significantly or only marginally? What steps should they avoid?

• What role can and should the technical community play in advancing these objectives?


This study provides a framework to analyze technology and innovation enabler investments to support military capabilities required in 2030. The following investment categories are outlined, each including several under-attended technology areas the U.S. Department of Defense should focus on: 1) Coping with parity, 2) achieving superiority through cost-imposing strategies, 3) achieving superiority through enhancing force effectiveness, and 4) anticipating surprise.


This report, drawing on the results of an expert workshop organized by the ELN and the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich (CSS), examines how a NATO-Russia conflict could break out, unfold and be terminated. Several scenarios are being considered and recommendations derived to prevent inadvertent outbreak of conflict and to control escalation should conflict arise.


In this edited volume, the authors examine the theory and practice of peacetime great-power strategic competition and derive recommendations for the U.S. to adopt a long-term strategy for dealing with China; one that includes but is not limited to military means, and that includes U.S. allies in the region. In Chapter 2, Stephen Rosen reviews the logic of the competitive strategies approach as developed and applied by the U.S. Department of Defense from 1973 to 2010 to specify how it can inform future strategy development.


This NIPP study chaired by Keith Payne and John Foster was conducted with the goal of assisting the production of and informing the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The chapter on NATO and European security develops a U.S./NATO response to a resurgent Russia. It specifically focuses on the role of U.S. leadership within the alliance, burden-sharing, dual-capable aircraft, and low-yield ballistic missile options in ensuring deterrence and assurance goals.


The unclassified summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy articulates U.S. strategy to “compete, deter, and win” in an environment that is increasingly being shaped by great power competition. According to the document, the U.S. military is supposed to be able to confront challengers across the spectrum of conflict, while focusing on the Asia-Pacific and Europe as priority theaters. Readiness and modernization as well as cooperation with allies and partners are also emphasized as priorities.


According to Zapfe, the establishment of the “enhanced Forward Presence” (eFP) in the Baltic States and Poland significantly enhances NATO’s defense and deterrence posture. However, he argues, when planning its next steps, NATO should moderate its quest for an ever-larger presence in the east. Instead, NATO should focus on planning and coordination, transparency measures, and “non-offensive defence”. Nevertheless, if Russian actions lead to
further deterioration of NATO-Russia relations, the Alliance should revisit its “1979 Double Track Decision on nuclear rearmament, and link the decision to reinforce with a conditioned offer to forgo this very reinforcement.”

**Panel 8: Evaluation Survey**

No readings

**Panel 9: On balancing deterrence, competition, and cooperation**

Key questions:

- Historically, NATO has pursued a dual-track strategy, combining defence and dialogue or, as some put it, deterrence and détente. In NATO’s current strategy, is the balance among these elements sound?
- How can it best advance its collective interests vis-à-vis Russia while also responding to other factors in the changing Euro-Atlantic security environment?


Frear, Kulesa and Raynova argue that the current NATO-Russia deterrence relationship is unstable and that the interplay between the defense and deterrence postures operated by Russia and NATO has not been sufficiently appreciated, producing misperception and potentially inadvertent escalation. They propose that Russia and NATO should cooperatively address perceived hostile intentions and create space for crisis management diplomacy to reduce risks.


Kühn argues that NATO’s current strategy toward Russia is imbalanced because it over-emphasizes power and risks negatively affecting the European security order. Accordingly, a new strategy should be developed, one that recalls the 1967 Harmel Report, which successfully combined the security elements of power, order, and liberal values. In order to succeed with such a multi-pronged strategy, the Allies need to better coordinate their policies in the OSCE and amongst EU countries.


The risk of escalation sparking a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high, Kühn warns, particularly in the Baltics, where the military balance favors Russia and where Moscow could instigate unrest among Russian minorities living there. To mitigate these risks and remain united, NATO members should complement deterrence with resilience and risk-reduction measures better tailored to addressing Russian behavior below the threshold of outright conventional and nuclear conflict.


Miller and Fontaine observe that “[t]he ongoing integration of new technologies by U.S. and Russian militaries—particularly cyber, space, long-range strike, missile defenses, autonomous systems, and big data analytics—is creating new and growing strains on strategic stability between these two great powers.” In light of the emerging challenges, they develop recommendations along three interrelated possible pathways: 1) the future course of U.S.-Russian relations; 2) potential slippery slopes from peacetime to crisis and conflict; and (3) the possibility that conflict could escalate to attacks against each other’s homeland and even nuclear war.

Vershbow argues that to achieve a more stable and constructive relationship with Moscow that is sustainable for the long term, the U.S. must speak with Russia from a position of strength. He proposes that a combination of strength and engagement—one that includes bolstering defense and deterrence, enhancing resilience, countering Russian disinformation, and principled engagement—is the best way to bring Russia back to compliance with international law and with Helsinki principles.

Reports from previous workshops at Wilton Park:


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