“Compete, Deter, and Win” in a Trans-Regional Perspective: On Meeting the New Challenges of Extended Deterrence

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Annotated Bibliography

“Compete, Deter, and Win” in a Trans-Regional Perspective: On Meeting the New Challenges of Extended Deterrence

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Key questions:
- How close are the United States and its allies to having the needed strategy and posture to compete, deter, and win (in the words of the 2018 National Defense Strategy), from the perspective of 21st century regional contingencies and their potential for all-domain escalation?
- Are the United States and its allies in agreement about the fundamental characteristics of modern regional war and 21st century strategic competition? Where do they agree and disagree?
- What more should be done to strengthen U.S. alliances and extended deterrence in light of the changing character of strategic competition and modern war? What more can be done?
- Can alliance strategies in one region be informed by experience in another? Where there are barriers to progress in one region, are there useful lessons from the other? Or are extended deterrence challenges sui generis?

Panel Topics:
1. Understanding the Red Theories of Victory
2. Understanding Progress in Developing Blue (Blue/Green) Theories of Victory
3. Meeting the Gray Zone Challenge
4. Preventing the Conventional Fait Accompli
5. Deterring and Responding to Nuclear Coercion and Limited Nuclear Attack
6. Managing Multi-Domain Escalation, De-Escalation, and War Termination
7. Integrating Deterrence, Competition, and Cooperation
8. Lessons Learned and Implications
Panel 1: Understanding the Red Theories of Victory

- In war, how do Russia, China, and North Korea hope to bring the United States and its allies to a culminating point (to quote Clausewitz) where they no longer choose to run the costs and risks of further war?
- In peace, how do they hope to subdue the United States and its allies without fighting (to quote Sun Tzu)? What are they competing for, and how are they competing?
- To what extent do they cooperate and/or learn from each other?


This paper from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs explains four fundamental cultural pillars of Russian strategic military thought: strategic uniqueness; strategic vulnerability; going to war with all of Russia; and the decisiveness of the initial period of war. Mirror imaging Western approaches and assumptions or relying on weapons capability-centric analysis alone, will not capture how Moscow sees future conflict and war.


This Livermore Paper on Global Security explores nuclear thresholds in Russian military doctrine with an eye to understanding how Russian thinking integrates the operational effects of conventional strikes with nuclear deterrence and coercion. The paper contributes to a debate about the place of escalate-to-deescalate strategies in Russian military thought and the prospects for Russian nuclear employment in a regional confrontation with NATO.


The paper analyzes evolution of Russian views on coercion from the post-Cold War “regional nuclear deterrence” thinking to the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” The author argues that current Russian operational art involves a nuclear dimension that can only be understood in the context of holistic coercion campaign, an integrated whole in which non-nuclear, informational, and nuclear capabilities can be used for deterrence and compellance.

This Livermore Paper on Global Security emphasizes how the intensifying competition between the U.S. and China may contribute to inadvertent escalation and dangerous strategic interactions. Following an analysis of potential military flashpoints in the China-U.S. relationship, the paper offers key principles that can guide the development of a U.S. approach to China. The authors maintain that despite China’s expansionism—military, economic, and ideological—domestic instability weighs heavily on the Chinese Communist Party cadres and can disrupt China’s grand strategy and reshape the geopolitical landscape.


The authors argue that Chinese strategic thinking is heavily influenced by both Sun Tzu and Andy Marshall, particularly their ideas about non-military means of conflict resolution and long-term competition. Together with the Chinese conception of sovereignty, which emphasizes dominance rather than non-interference, these ideas guide contemporary Chinese strategic competition with the United States.


This 2015 report, published by the US-Korea Institute at SAIS, recognizes the need to explore North Korea’s nuclear strategy despite the lack of reliable sources. The author provides an analytical framework for four alternative North Korean nuclear strategies: (1) extract international political or diplomatic concessions; (2) internationalize crises on the Korean peninsula in a way that triggers U.S. and/or Chinese intermediation; (3) deter regime-threatening attacks; and (4) nuclear warfighting to offset conventional weaknesses vis-à-vis South Korea and the United States. Within this framework, the author assesses past North Korea’s strategy and where it is going.


This testimony at the Foreign Affairs Committee contends that North Korea has an established playbook for achieving its strategic goals. For the Kim regime, nuclear weapons are the sole means to its long-term regime preservation and serve as a tool to win the competition for pan-Korean legitimacy against the ROK. In addition, the
testimony recounts North Korea’s numerous diplomatic engagements that served as smokescreens for continued military buildup.


The assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community outlines pressing foreign policy issues across all domains and regions. According to the assessment, China and Russia will continue building closer ties and increasing military cooperation, while also challenging the U.S. ideologically. North Korea, in turn, will seek to reduce international pressure while keeping its nuclear weapons program. In space, for example, the assessment concludes China and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and acquiring new antisatellite weapons to threaten U.S. and allied space services.

**Panel 2: Understanding Progress in Developing Blue (Blue/Green) Theories of Victory**

- How does the United States expect to deter conflicts and, if necessary, win them? What is its ‘theory of victory’ in regional wars against adversaries armed with nuclear weapons and prepared to compete for strategic advantage in all domains? How does it envision the mixture of strong deterrence and effective competition creating the circumstances for an enduring peace?
- How do U.S. allies view the requirements of competing, deterring, and winning? Do they have a ‘theory of victory’? How dynamic are these views? How convergent or divergent, with the United States and across regions?


The prepared statements for the hearing posit that the United States needs to urgently shift gears and concentrate its energy and resources on great power competition. Cautioning that Beijing and Moscow have plausible theories of victory, the witnesses maintain that it will take a coordinated and overwhelming response of the United States and its allies to prevent peer-competitors from achieving their goals. They further emphasize that the U.S. government will not succeed in the competition if it does not adjust its present trajectory.


The article maintains that assuming that China’s power continues to grow, the U.S. will need to cooperate even more closely with its allies. U.S. policies towards China have failed and now an alternative U.S. and allied China strategy is urgently required. This approach should include stepped-up balancing and constrained engagement. The author urges the members of this coalition to include European as well as Asian nations.

The author, from NATO’s Defense Policy and Planning Division, underlines that the Alliance’s posture is effective, defensive and de-escalatory by nature. However, NATO can improve on various aspects, specifically it needs to have a clear perception of Russia, and to find a strategy to deter threats under the Article 5 threshold. The latter point is particularly important given Russia’s hybrid warfare and cyber attacks. The author suggests that the alliance is moving towards a “theory of everything” with an aim of increasing “overall coherence” of its posture.


In this Livermore Paper on Global Security, the author provides insights into the U.S.-Japan security relationship by describing the complex interplay of conventional and nuclear military capabilities, diplomatic efforts, and Japanese domestic opinion that determines and constrains the efforts of both nations to meet these challenges. The paper also outlines an agenda for U.S.-Japan extended deterrence dialogue, which includes practical military, doctrinal, and diplomatic steps that the U.S. and Japan should each take to build cooperation on security issues.


The policy memorandum, issued by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, discerns the threats that the U.S.-Japan alliance faces in the Asia-Pacific, particularly a rising China and the growing North Korean challenge, and the ways that the alliance can cope with them. The paper recommends institutionalizing current efforts to improve the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence, expanding Track 1.5 dialogues with China on nuclear weapons issues and deterrence responses to North Korea, among others.


In dealing with the DPRK, the authors warn against the two options of (1) withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea without tangible results from the North Korean side and (2) the preemptive military strikes that would put at risk not only American cities, but also thousands of Americans residing in Seoul and Tokyo. Instead, the authors advocate for strengthening a global coalition that implemented a successful sanctions program; making North Korea’s issue a part of the nonproliferation effort; upgrading U.S. alliance
commitments to South Korea and Japan; and seeking assurances from Kim Jong Un that DPRK will not proliferate.


The U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue conference report reveals regional political and security dynamics, as well as differences in priorities among allies. Participants in the dialogue came to a consensus that Kim Jong Un has not decided to denuclearize and is unlikely to do so. The ROK and Japan agreed that the maximum pressure campaign reached its peak by June of 2018, and will be nearly impossible to reestablish. Additionally, Seoul and Washington disagreed on the importance and acceptability of confidence-building measures—Seoul seeks more patience and lenience from Washington in regard to North Korea’s denuclearization, while Tokyo and Washington see Seoul as giving DPRK too much without reciprocation.


The report from the inaugural U.S.-Australia Indo-Pacific deterrence dialogue stresses that great power competition in the Indo-Pacific demands an updated approach toward deterrence by the United States and Australia, as well as by other allies and partners. Rather than posing a purely military challenge, China’s use of grey zone coercion, geoeconomic leverage, emerging technologies, and nuclear modernization constitutes a multi-domain threat. The report argues that the United States and Australia should consider developing a shared Indo-Pacific strategy to manage the respective lines of effort, military capabilities and other resources that can be brought to bear by the alliance towards deterrence goals in the region.


The article explains that, despite being treaty allies, the United States and Australia have a lot of work to do to strengthen the alliance. China’s adventurism and island building in the South China Sea exposed the lack of a U.S.-Australia political-military framework to push back in the gray zone areas and resist Chinese influence. The author outlines a set of recommendations for repairing the alliance, including developing a strategic policy framework and improving command and control arrangements.
Panel 3: Meeting the Gray Zone Challenge

- How have NATO and U.S. bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific dealt with the efforts of neighboring major powers to use means short of armed combat (including shows of force, increased local military presence, political warfare, information warfare, and cyber activities) to try to re-make the regional order in ways they prefer?
- Have they done enough? What more needs to be done?
- What barriers to further progress have emerged? Are there valuable cross-regional lessons and implications?


The article, published by the National Defense University, suggests that the current U.S. security community lacks a clear taxonomy for constituent parts of the continuum on conflict. The author specifically addresses gray zone tactics and hybrid warfare techniques, offering definitions of each and distinguishing them in application. The article looks forward to consider how the U.S. might prepare for the complete array of challenges it could face in today’s dynamic environment.


This 2017 RAND report analyzes the Russian hybrid warfare threat, dividing possible aggressive action into three categories: subversion, covert violent action and conventional force. It finds that given local security preparations, as well as increasing integration of Russian speakers in the Baltics, Russia will likely have difficulty destabilizing the region with non-violent means. The author recommends that the United States and NATO should pursue the development of a more sophisticated and subtle communication campaign and further strengthen security forces of the Baltic countries to reduce the potential for Russian covert action. Additionally, U.S. and NATO leaders should consider measures to increase transparency, avoid the perception that deployed forces may be used to pursue regime change, and develop a sound public relations campaign to convince local Russian speakers that NATO is not deploying forces against them.


This article focuses on Russia’s potential use of political warfare to paralyze the politics in NATO member states and undermine the alliance. The author suggests that a prevailing NATO fixation on member state defense spending to deter Russian conventional aggression ignores the political challenge of Russia weakening NATO from
within. The article further contends that NATO must build upon its whole-of-nation approaches, public-private partnerships, and cyber capabilities to counter this threat.


This RAND report notes that China is trying to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific without firing a shot, gradually shifting the strategic playing field through the employment of gray zone coercion, lying below the threshold that would trigger a military response. China’s actions in the maritime, cyber, and space domains challenge the status quo in ways that damage the interests of both Japan and the United States, and are intended to erode trust in U.S. extended deterrence commitments. The report draws on two public hearings with American and Japanese experts, convened by RAND, and offers four steps to deterring gray zone coercion, as well as recommendations for realizing these steps.


The authors investigate how China has gone about prosecuting gray zone strategy in the South China Sea. The article considers how its sophisticated integration of civil-military maritime tactics pose a particularly vexing challenge to the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific alliances. By identifying typologies of gray zone deterrence, the authors discern patterns in Chinese policy and strategy with the aim of helping United States-led alliances face down aggression in maritime Asia.


The author considers the general threat posed by the emergence of gray zone tactics and articulates a conceptual framework for gray zone deterrence. The article focuses specifically on gray zone challenges posed to Japan and reviews its efforts to develop a gray zone deterrence strategy, including consistent state intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, military exercises, and other signals of operational effectiveness or so-called ‘dynamic deterrence’.
The conference found that the primary challenges faced by the United States from its chief regional competitors—China and North Korea—are similar in key respects. Each is trying to use speed, geography, and asymmetry of stakes to reach their objectives without provoking an American military response. South Korea and Japan fear gray zone challenges from North Korea and China, and both seek more clarity about how the United States will contribute to their security in these contexts. The report highlights areas of convergence and disagreement on countering Chinese and North Korean gray zone challenges.

Panel 4: Preventing the Conventional Fait Accompli

- How has NATO been adapting to deter a limited military attack, including a territorial fait accompli, against one of its members?
- How have the U.S., Japan, and South Korea prepared for analogous military threats in the Asia-Pacific region?
- Have they done enough? What more can be done?
- What barriers to further progress have emerged? Are there valuable cross-regional lessons and implications?


The analysis, published by the International Centre for Defence Studies, assesses the recent evolution of NATO thinking at the 2014 Wales Summit, the 2016 Warsaw Summit, and the 2018 Brussels Summit. It considers, inter alia, the alliance’s re-emphasis on deterrence and defense in countering local or regional threats or attacks and the possibility of a potential fait accompli.


This Atlantic Council piece notes post-2014 enhancements to U.S.-NATO posture in deterring potential Russian aggression in North Central Europe and expresses a need for further enhanced deterrence. It surveys a list of possible enhancements to regional U.S. force posture and enumerates a set of principles to guide eventual deployment.

The 2018 RAND report informs the debate over appropriate NATO posture and force structure in order to respond to the recent growth in Russian military capability and capacity, as well as the increased Russian assertiveness in the use of force. Given NATO’s current posture and capability, including multinational battalions and a rotational U.S. armored brigade combat team, Russia can still achieve a rapid *fait accompli* in the Baltic states followed by brinksmanship to attempt to freeze the conflict. The authors analyze this threat in the Baltics and offer recommendations for enhancing deterrence to counter it.


According to the author, China will continue to challenge, if not overtake, the United States in maritime supremacy in the South China Sea. This piece posits that this could lead to a future scenario in which the United States and China come into direct conflict. It assesses the United States’ approach, to date, in working with regional allies and notes some more muscular measures the U.S. government might consider.

Wuest, Craig R. *Multi-Domain Deterrence Table Top Exercise Summary*. Livermore, California: CGSR, 30 January 2018. [https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Wuest_Multi-Domain_Deterrence_Table_Top_Exercise_Summary-January-2018.pdf](https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Wuest_Multi-Domain_Deterrence_Table_Top_Exercise_Summary-January-2018.pdf).

The multi-domain deterrence exercise contemplated possible North Korean aggression in Northeast Asia and the Asia Pacific. It examined four scenarios, involving differing degrees of aggression in multiple domains. The key questions considered were: how should the United States establish consensus with allies regarding red lines and thresholds; how should the United States determine responses to North Korean aggression to best restore deterrence and reassure allies; how should the United States and its allies agree on what constitutes a strategic attack; and what should the response options be in the event of nuclear use, short of a successful attack on United States and/or allied interests?
Panel 5: Deterring and Responding to Nuclear Coercion and Limited Nuclear Attack

- How have the approaches of the U.S. and its regional allies to deter, and if necessary, respond to nuclear coercion or limited nuclear employment evolved over the last few decades?
- Should further improvements to extended deterrence hardware (capabilities) and software (consultations, planning, exercises, etc.) in the two regions be made? If so, how?
- What barriers to further progress have emerged? Are there valuable cross-regional lessons and implications?


The author of the this Livermore Paper on Global Security argues that in order to safeguard its national interests as well as its allies’, the United States will need to be nimble in drafting its future nuclear deterrence strategies, accounting for general trends and adversaries’ specific capabilities. Focusing on China, North Korea, and Russia, the author considers factors that may either discourage or incentivize their employment of nuclear weapons in the context of a regional conflict.


According to the authors, since the Cold War, the United States’ approach to deterrence has evolved to favor the use of conventional forces, exclusive from nuclear deterrents. In confronting adversaries who are employing hybrid (conventional-nuclear) deterrence strategies, the authors argue that the current U.S. approach to deterrence will not be sufficient. The best alternative will be to increase integration between nuclear and non-nuclear policies and strategies.


The author argues that the current security environment of the Korean Peninsula is at its most dire in recent years due to North Korea’s nuclear advancements. As such, the author states that it is time for South Korea to appeal to Washington in redeploying nuclear weapons, along with dual-use aircraft. Should Washington refuse, South Korea should engage in its own nuclear projects to successfully deter Pyeongyang.

This paper examines the past and current U.S. Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs). By analyzing the history of the U.S. NPRs, the author describes key factors that led to noticeable changes and assesses how those changes were reflected in Japan. The author notes how the 2018 U.S. NPR highlights a return to the nuclear posture of the Bush administration, emphasizing the role of low-yield SLBMs and SLCMs, along with a wide range of nuclear capabilities for deterring nuclear attacks against Japan.


In this piece, the author considers the potential implications of North Korea’s deployment of nuclear ballistic missiles for the Korean peninsula, as well as the broader Asian-Pacific region. The author provides specific policy recommendations for the United States in order to proactively overcome the threat of nuclear blackmail and to bolster extended deterrence vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan.


The author challenges the criticism around the 2018 U.S. NPR, arguing that Russia has, in fact, developed a strategy of limited nuclear first use, and that various strategic documents and official statements confirm this conclusion. The author contends that despite having shifted to favor strategic conventional weapons in recent years, Moscow maintains the nuclear component of its systems. Moreover, the notions of “offense” and “defense” are not so clear-cut in Russian deterrence thinking or strategy.


In this paper, the author argues that NATO allies should respond to the 2018 U.S. NPR, by: agreeing on specific language regarding the nuclear challenges posed by Russia, recognizing U.S. efforts to bolster NATO nuclear deterrence posture, emphasizing the value of nuclear sharing arrangements, and reaffirming NATO’s statements on arms control and disarmament. Additionally, the author maintains that NATO allies should
establish a broader process that will develop comprehensive deterrence and defense strategies that treat nuclear deterrence as an integral part of a multi-domain approach.

*For further reading on NATO and extended deterrence in Europe, see:


Panel 6: Managing Multi-Domain Escalation, De-Escalation, and War Termination

- Are Red approaches to all-domain escalation control well understood?
- Have Blue strategies for controlling escalation been updated to account for new geopolitical, military, and technical factors?
- Has this been approached primarily as a U.S. task or as a shared task?
- What key allied interests should guide U.S. thinking about this topic? What fractures might appear in U.S. alliances in such a conflict?
- Are there valuable cross-regional lessons and implications?


The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments on how advancements in space, information systems, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and missile technology have accelerated the speed and complexity of war. This statement outlines how the U.S. is adapting to address all-domain, transregional challenges and conflict, while maintaining a competitive advantage. By calling for global integration, General Dunford announces an approach to address challenges holistically to enable execution of military campaigns with a flexibility and speed that outpaces potential adversaries.
Panels 5 & 6 at the 2018 CGSR workshop emphasized that effective escalation management requires an understanding of different forms of escalation (intentional, inadvertent, accidental), multiple pathways to escalation across the various domains (nuclear, conventional, cyber, space), and how these dynamics differ depending on the size of an adversary’s nuclear arsenal. There are several factors that can make crises less stable within the context of strategic competition. In particular, with new technologies, there are significant risks of a perceived first strike advantage, fears of a preemptive attack, or beliefs that the conflict cannot be managed and, therefore, escalation is inevitable.


This 2008 monograph, issued by RAND, examines the risks of escalation in the 21st century and assesses the implications for military confrontations with adversaries armed with nuclear weapons and asymmetric capabilities. With a focus on the fundamental nature of escalation, the authors assess the motives and mechanisms that drive escalation in military conflict, and what can be done to manage those escalation risks in today’s complex environment. Managing inadvertent escalation will require the clarification of thresholds, which are social constructs defined by allies and adversaries. The authors call for the development of deterrent strategies, and more explicit U.S. statements about thresholds and deterrent threats.


In this CNAS report, the authors argue that the changes in U.S.-Russian political relations and the military-technological landscape are reshaping the ways in which a U.S.-Russian crisis and conflict would likely unfold. By developing a framework that identifies three distinct yet related pathways, the authors consider how these developments will impact strategic stability for the years to come. Pathway 1 demonstrates that deteriorating political relations between the U.S. and Russia will heighten the likelihood of crisis or conflict, thereby bringing into play Pathway 2 or the potential slippery slopes of escalation. These slippery slopes will involve pressures to escalate with “non-kinetic” capabilities during a crisis or early in a conflict. The authors claim that this in turn may increase fears of war, thereby elevating nuclear risks and increasing the potential dangers
of strategic instability—portrayed by Pathway 3. This report outlines alternative scenarios along each pathway that can help guide the development and evaluation of policy options.


The authors suggest that the prevailing NATO-Russia deterrence relationship is unstable, given the interplay between their two postures. While Russia’s “integrated strategic deterrence” exploits unpredictability and envisions taking preemptive action to dominate early stages of conflict, NATO’s “modern deterrence” varies between projecting restraint and deterring Russia. Because this interaction creates the risk of misunderstandings and rapid escalation, the authors argue that informal measures, such as unilateral re-examination of deterrence postures and cooperation through crisis management diplomacy, can reduce the risks of inadvertent escalation and conflict.


In a review of PLA writings on escalation of crises and conflicts that have appeared since 2008, this CNAS report identifies four central findings about current Chinese thinking on escalation, as well as U.S. policy implications: (1) escalation of crises and conflicts (“war control”) emerged only recently as a critical subject for Chinese strategists; (2) the Chinese believe that crises and wars should be controlled in order to protect the economy and ensure the Chinese Communist Party remains legitimate domestically; (3) for the Chinese, war can be controlled only if capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and command and control, as well as precision weapons, are strengthened and advanced; and (4) Chinese strategists are silent regarding potential escalation risks that may accompany Chinese military doctrine and concepts. The author calls on U.S. strategists and officials to gain a deeper understanding on how these escalation concepts blur over into Chinese cyberspace and counterspace operations.


Drawing from over two dozen PLA writings, the authors explore the current state of Chinese military thinking on how crisis and conflict erupt, escalate, and end. This 2016 CNA study focuses on the PLA’s views of conventional conflict and finds that Chinese military activities in a crisis could be perceived as and become escalatory even if they are not intended to do so. Since the PLA’s views and practices of crisis management are evolving, the authors identify several questions that need further exploration, including
how the PLA would handle a conflict for which it is not prepared, and how the PLA would prioritize costs and benefits of continuing a conflict.

Panel 7: Integrating Deterrence, Competition, and Cooperation

- Are these objectives adequately integrated in practice in Europe and East Asia?
- Has the re-balancing of these objectives in recent years paid useful dividends?
- Could an increased emphasis on cooperation (and de-emphasis of deterrence and competition) generate an increased will to cooperate in Moscow, Beijing, and/or Pyongyang? Are new forms of cooperation, including but not limited to arms control and risk reduction, plausible?
- Are there valuable cross-regional lessons and implications?


Panel 4 at this CGSR workshop examined how deterrence and competition can be complementary goals if the objective of strategic competition is to re-establish or strengthen deterrence. Keeping in mind that competition and deterrence may be contradictory, especially if the goal is to dominate. Instead of bolstering deterrence, competition may incentivize military challenges and escalation in a conflict. Moreover, participants discuss how the role of the U.S. allies in strategic competition currently remains unclear. In order to reap the benefits of strategic competition while avoiding the unintended risks, the U.S. must develop a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach that utilizes the U.S. comparative advantages, including its allies.


The author notes that the U.S. must reacquaint itself with the 12 bedrock principles of long-term competition in order to succeed in the geopolitical rivalries playing out today. Long-term competition should be comprehensive and entail outmaneuvering, deterring, and coercing an adversary. While the U.S. should not necessarily compete with its adversaries on every geographic front, any serious strategy should incorporate all elements of national power. The article further highlights that embarking upon long-term competition does require a willingness to accept certain risks and higher tensions in key relationships, but this does not inevitably imply conflict. Instead, the U.S. cannot afford to abandon diplomacy, cooperation, and operating multilaterally with its allies.

In this report, the author discusses how the European security architecture has been weakened by renewed geopolitical competition, technological and military developments, and states violating international law. Moreover, Cold War instruments of cooperative security that have reduced the risks of arms races and inadvertent escalation are increasingly being strained. This report examines current and future sources of strategic instability, with a specific focus on how Russia is waging modern conflict through strategic ambiguity and operational opacity. The author argues that strengthening strategic stability in Europe requires an approach that reinforces deterrence and defense in Europe through new confidence and security-building and arms control measures.


This 2018 CNAS report concludes that in order to reduce the risk of crisis or conflict arising from Russian miscalculation, comprehensive steps to maintain bilateral strategic stability and a clearly articulated U.S. approach are crucial. While the potential for a U.S.-Russian nuclear exchange is low today, the authors express that it is critical to recognize that this is due to decades of U.S. investment in diverse and survivable nuclear delivery systems, as well as thoughtful policy actions. Therefore, the authors argue the retention and extension of New START is also critical for bolstering strategic stability.

**Panel 8: Lessons Learned and Implications**

- Is “compete, deter, win” a sound strategic approach to the problems of extended deterrence and regional conflict in an era of the 21st century strategic competition?
- Are there new challenges of extended deterrence well defined in this approach?
- Does a trans-regional perspective add significantly to this analysis?
- What more can and should be done to out-think, out-partner, and out-innovate potential adversaries in regional conflicts?


In their evaluation of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Commission concludes that while the NDS is accurate in its portrayal of the evolving global security environment, it lacks the proper, specific approaches in proceeding further. Unless new operational concepts are developed and whole-of-government approaches pursued, the Commission believes that the U.S. will continue to fall behind its global adversaries and competitors.

During Panel 8 of this workshop, discussion focused on ways for the U.S. to effectively out-think its adversaries, an aspect the discussants largely believed the National Defense Strategy (NDS) fell short in addressing. Out-thinking adversaries will require a more robust national strategy, emphasis on emerging technologies, investment in future leaders, and new operational concepts.


Over the past century, wargames have become increasingly critical in assisting military officials and policymakers to better understand how decisions are made in the context of international security. Through a combination of experimental approaches and modern simulation tools, the authors argue that science-based simulations have the potential to provide fresh insights as to how different strategies will play out, particularly in the domain of nuclear weapons.

**Summaries of previous CGSR Workshops on U.S. extended deterrence in transregional perspective, see:**


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